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I. Introduction  
 
Contemporary constitutional theory has difficulty fully comprehending the relationship 
between Dred Scott v. Sandford2  and the post-Civil War Amendments.  The connection seems 
simple.  Republicans proposed and ratified the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in part to 
reverse the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott.  The Thirteenth Amendment’s declaration 
that “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist in the United States” overturns the 
sections in Chief Justice Roger Taney’s opinion which held that the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment vests persons with a constitutional right to bring their slaves into American 
territories.3  The declaration in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment that “all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States and of the State where they 
reside” overturns the passages in the Dred Scott majority opinion holding that former slaves were 
constitutionally barred from becoming citizens of the United States.4  The problem with this 
conventional view is that Republicans in 1866 had good reasons for thinking that passing 
                                                 
1 Sandy Levinson, Jack Balkin, Howard Gillman, Gerard Magliocca, Cynthia Nicoletti, Maxwell Sterans, and 
Brandon Garrett all generously commented on previous versions of this manuscript.  I have not yet had time to 
incorporate the vast majority of their important suggestions. 
2 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
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constitutional amendments was not an effective means for achieving those antislavery and 
egalitarian ends.  The standard Republican explanation for why the judicial majority reached 
proslavery and racist conclusions in Dred Scott suggests that antislavery advocates should have 
regarded constitutional amendments aimed at altering judicial practice as a waste of legislative 
energy. 
Republicans to a person insisted that the justices in Dred Scott unreasonably interpreted 
the Constitution of 1789 when they ruled that Congress had no power to ban slavery in American 
territories.5   Virtually all antislavery activists believed that Article IV, Section 3 plainly entitled 
the national legislature to prohibit human bondage in the western regions.6  The phrase 
“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” in their view, obviously vested 
federal authorities with the same power over slavery in national territories as state authorities had 
to regulate human bondage within their jurisdictional boundaries.  This antislavery conclusion 
was buttressed by more than a half century of federal governance in the territories.  Abraham 
Lincoln and other Republicans maintained that Congress without serious objection in 1789 
banned slavery in the Northwest Territories7 and in 1820 banned slavery in all territories north of 
the 36°30′ parallel line.8  Many Republicans thought the due process clause of the Fifth 
                                                 
5 Prominent Republicans before the Civil War were publicly more divided on the citizenship status of free blacks.  
See Abraham Lincoln, “Seventh and Last Debate with Stephan A. Douglas at Alton Illinois,” The Collected Works 
of Abraham Lincoln (edited by Roy P. Basler) (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, NJ, 1953), p. 299 
(declaring that he had never “complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it declared . . . that a negro 
could not be a citizen).” 
6 A few radical abolitionists claimed that the Constitution was a pro-slavery “covenant with death and an agreement 
with hell” that provided extensive protections for human bondage.  “Covenant with Death,” Liberator, March 13, 
1863, p. 1. See Wendell Phillips, The Constitution a Pro-Slavery compact, or Extracts from the Madison papers, etc. 
(American Antislavery Society: New York, 1856). 
7  
8  Contrary to Republican claims, many Southerners during the Missouri Compromise debates insisted that Congress 
had no power to ban slavery in the territories.  See Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional 
Evil (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2006), pp. ___. 
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Amendment affirmatively prohibited slavery in the territories.9  Few if any before the Civil War 
confessed that the status of slavery in the territories was a close constitutional question upon 
which persons in good faith might disagree.  Lincoln described Dred Scott as an “obvious 
mistake.”10  Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine in 1858 declared that the judicial decision 
was “utterly at variance with all truth . . ., utterly destitute of all legal logic . . ., found on error, 
and unsupported by anything like argument.”11 
Republican claims that no responsible constitutional decision maker could conclude that 
slaveholders had a right to bring their human property into the territories make problematic the 
apparent Republican decision during the mid-1860s to reverse Dred Scott by ratifying better 
constitutional language.  The same justices who Republicans condemned for ignoring or 
perverting the plain meaning of Article IV, Section 3 could presumably in the future ignore or 
pervert the plain meaning of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Pro-slavery justices in 
1868 might even have been able to make interpretively competent claims that states could pass 
numerous measures designed to control an “unruly” black labor force that were consistent the 
constitutional ban on slavery.  If, as Howard Gillman details, antebellum constitutional 
authorities thought state and federal laws could make distinctions between classes of persons 
when the legislation was based on real differences between affected groups and served the public 
welfare,12 then white supremacists might without much legal difficulty sustain state laws making 
racial discriminations that were based on what most people living at the end of the Civil War 
thought were real differences between the races.  Equal protection clause precedents justifying 
                                                 
9 Abraham Lincoln’s speech at Cooper Union is the best known example of this defense of federal power to ban 
slavery in the territories.  See Abraham Lincoln, “Address at Cooper Institute, New York City,” 4 Collected Works, 
pp.  523-35. 
10 Lincoln, “Cooper Institute, “ p. 546, 
11 Congressional Globe, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 617.   
12 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 
(Duke University Press: Durham, NC, 1993), pp. 61-62. 
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state bans on women practicing law in part because “the civil law, as well as nature herself, has 
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and 
woman”13 could easily be extended to cover laws prohibiting persons of color from practicing 
law on the basis of perceived natural differences between members of different races.14 
The persons who framed the post-Civil War Amendments had no good reason for 
thinking that racist, pro-slavery constitutional authorities, whom they thought had repeatedly 
ignored the plain meaning of the antebellum Constitution, would behave better when interpreting 
the plain meaning of the post-bellum Constitution.  Republicans did not regard Dred Scott as the 
unfortunate consequence of a few aberrant justices.  They asserted t the Supreme Court’s 
proslavery rulings were part of a broader Slave Power plot against the Constitution.  Lincoln in 
his debates with Douglas claimed that the Dred Scott decision was a product of a conspiracy 
between Democrats in all three branches of the national government.15 Senator John Hale of 
New Hampshire was one of many antislavery advocates who maintained that “The Supreme 
Court has been a part of the machinery of the old Democratic party.”  This court,” he continued, 
“have not been careful to study and find out and declare the law; but they have been careful to 
declare what was agreeable to the party in power.”16  Much evidence indicated that the 
constitutional future would resemble the constitutional past.  The leaders of the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress were familiar with accounts from northern visitors to the southern states that described 
in detail how a revived Slave Power was planning on regaining control of the national 
government and rendering practical nullities those constitutional amendments passed during the 
                                                 
13 See, i.e., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (claiming that real differences 
between men and women justified a state law prohibiting women from practicing law). 
14 Cite to Stephenson, Racial Distinctions.  More creative constitutional decisions makers might claim that the 
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments have never been ratified, see Bruce Ackerman, FIND, or that they were 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments.  See Leser v. Garnett. FIND.  On unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments in general, see Murphy; Graber. 
15  
16 Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 26 
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short interregnum of Republican rule.  In a widely circulated analysis of conditions in the former 
Confederate states in the wake of the Civil War, Carl Schurz reported “a desire to preserve 
slavery in its original form as much and as long as possible.”17  A prominent Northern journalist 
on a southern journey observed former slave state elites committed to do what was political 
necessary 
to obtain the exclusive control of the freedmen and to make such laws for them as 
shall embody the prejudices of the late slave-holding society; to govern not only 
their own states but to regain their forfeited leadership in the affairs of the nation; 
to effect the repudiation of the national debt or to get the Confederate debt and the 
Rebel state debts assumed by the whole country; to secure payment for their 
slaves, and for all injuries and losses occasioned by the war. 
  
Combatting this threat to the fruits of the Union victory in the Civil War merely by adding more, 
perhaps clearer, words to the Constitution of the United States, from the perspective of 
Republicans on the eve of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, was as likely to be as effective as the 
behavior of the lost American tourist in outer Slobobia who attempts to get a local resident to 
understand English by repeating more slowly and at greater volume the sentence “where is the 
nearest gas station.”   
 This paper maintains that Republicans when drafting the Fourteenth Amendment sought 
to avoid a repeat of such constitutional perversions as Dred Scott by constructing a constitutional 
politics that guaranteed to the extent feasible that the persons who remained loyal to the Union 
during the Civil War, white and black, would control the meaning of the post-Civil War 
Constitution.   The Thirteenth Amendment had already abolished slavery.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to prevent the rebirth of the Slave Power.  Sections 2 and 3 the 
Fourteenth Amendment were the texts most crucial to this constitutional mission.  Members of 
                                                 
17 Carl Schurz, “Report on the Condition of the South,” Senate Document No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1865).  Other northerners travelling south at this time reached the same conclusion.  See notes ---, below, 
and the relevant text. 
 
6 
 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress thought these provisions would most likely compel the South to 
enfranchise persons of color and, if not, sharply reduce the influence of former slave states and 
slaveowers on national policy and constitutional decision making.  Republicans cheerfully 
endorsed the more substantive provisions in Section 1 (and Section 4).  Nevertheless, the 
Republican leadership in the House and Senate understood that the rights, restrictions and 
powers enumerated in Section 1, 4, and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as those 
enumerated in Sections 1 and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, would be interpreted and 
implemented in good faith only if Sections 2 and 3 successfully reconstructed American 
constitutional politics so as to ensure the continued hegemony of the political party of the people 
who remained loyal during the Civil War.  We can understand the vital role Section 2 and 3 
played in Republican constitutional thought and fully comprehend the relationship between Dred 
Scott and the post-Civil War constitutional amendments, however, only if we turn away from a 
constitutional theory obsessed constitutional law and interpreting what constitutional provisions 
mean and focus on a constitutional theory devoted constitutional politics and the study of how 
constitutions work and might be made to work better.   
Constitutional commentators fail to appreciate Section 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in particular and how constitutions work more generally because they think of 
constitutions as devices that create and restrict official power.  Constitutional analysis in most 
universities is largely confined to the study of constitutional law.  Leading scholars define 
constitutionalism as a system of legal constraints on official power.  Giovanni Sartori regards a 
constitution as “a fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative 
institutional arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a ‘limited 
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government.’”18   Chief Justice John Roberts in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius declared, “The Federal Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated 
powers,” and this “enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers, because ‘[t]he 
enumerated presupposes something not enumerated.’”19   
Constitutional provisions in constitutions that work primarily by creating and 
constraining government power are framed to address some inadequacy in preexisting 
constitutional rights, powers and restrictions.   The Fourteenth Amendment, from this 
perspective, was motivated by Republican concerns with Black Codes and related southern 
efforts to preserve previous labor relationships and racial hierarchies in the former Confederate 
states.  Justice Samuel Miller expressed what has become common wisdom when in his opinion 
in the Slaughter-House Cases he declared, “circumstances . . . forced upon the statesmen who 
had conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis of the rebellion, and who 
supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the result of their labors, 
the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the 
unfortunate race who had suffered so much.”20  The appropriate constitutional response to 
southern attempts to retain powerful racial hierarchies, Miller and those who accept his history 
assume, was a constitutional amendment that restricted state power to create racial hierarchies 
and vested Congress with more power to achieve the constitutional commitment to equality 
under law. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Black Codes and related measures. 
                                                 
18 Giovanni Sartori, “Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion,” 56 American Political Science Review 853, 855 
(1962).  See Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, Sotorios A. Barber, and Stephen Macedo, American 
Constitutional Interpretation (3rd ed.) (Foundation Press: New York, 2003), pp. 48-49.  On liberal constitutionalism 
in general, see Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press: New 
York, 2013), pp. 35-37. 
19 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, at 2577. 
20 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1873). 
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes the federal government to enforce those 
limitations on state power. 
 Contemporary constitutional theory’s emphasis on interpretation follows from 
contemporary constitutional theory’s understanding of how constitutions work.  Constitutions 
that work by constraining and creating official power must be interpreted (or constructed)21 in 
order to determine the scope of the enumerated rights, restrictions and powers.  What 
Republicans did when they drafted Section 1 depends on what such phrases as “equal protection 
of the laws” mean.  What Republicans thought they were doing depends on what they thought 
the language they used meant.  Through interpretation, originalist or otherwise, we learn how the 
Fourteenth Amendment changed constitutional law by enumerating new constitutional rights, 
new federal powers, and new restrictions on state power. Working from this legal perspective, 
the voluminous literature on the Fourteenth Amendment asks such questions as “Does the equal 
protection clause prohibit segregated schools” and “Which branch of the national government 
has the final authority to determine the meaning of the equal protection clause.” 
 Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment are better conceptualized as means for 
constructing constitutional politics than as constraints on constitutional politics.  The main 
concern that animated the Fourteenth Amendment was the Republican fear that a united south 
would combine with the Democratic Party to undo the fruits of the Civil War, most notably the 
newly minted constitutional ban on slavery.  Republicans members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
were more concerned with ensuring that existing constitutional rights would be respected and 
existing constitutional powers exercised appropriately than with enumerating additional 
constitutional rights and powers.  The persons responsible for drafting the Fourteenth 
                                                 
21 See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, MA 2001). 
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Amendment discussed numerous means for ensuring that the persons who remained loyal to the 
Union during the Civil War would control the interpretation of existing constitutional rights, 
powers, and restrictions.  Section 2, they believed, would force southerners to choose between 
empowering black voters who would vote Republican or losing substantial representation in both 
Congress and the Electoral College.  Proposed versions of Section 3 placed sharp limits on the 
capacity of former Confederates to participate in national affairs.   
 The shift from how constitutions create and constrain politics to how constitutions 
construct politics alters the focus of constitutional analysis from what constitutional provisions 
mean to how they work.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides an easy illustration of the 
difference between these two modes of constitutional analysis.  Most Republican members of the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress did not believe that any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment legally 
compelled states to grant male persons of color the right to vote.  Nevertheless, most believed 
that if the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, southern states would grant male persons of color 
the ballot when the alternative was a state delegation in Congress and in the Electoral College 
reduced by forty percent.  Rather than making dramatic changes in the texts constitutional 
decision makers interpreted, Republicans sought to influence the selection of the constitutional 
decision makers who would interpret the post-bellum constitution.  The post-bellum Constitution 
would work because Republicans rather than Democrats or former slaveholders would control 
the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional texts that articulated a 
commitment to equality under law.   
 The primary purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to construct the constitutional 
politics that would guarantee the fruits of the northern victory and ensure meaningful 
implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Reconstruction Republicans were far more 
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concerned with constructing a politics that would guarantee the enduring ascendancy of the 
victorious northern majority than with placing any particular limits on what that majority would 
do.  This explains why the persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment debated at length 
the precise language of Sections 2, which concerned the allocation of representation in the House 
of Representatives and votes in the Electoral College, and 3, which concerned restrictions on the 
political rights of former Confederates, while devoting very little attention to various versions of 
Section 1, which enumerates constitutional rights and powers.  Republicans settled intra-party 
disputes over how best to restructure constitutional politics.  They agreed to disagree on the 
precise rights protected by the post-bellum Constitution.22 
 The following pages detail the Republican effort to construct a constitutional politics that 
privileged the rights and interests of those Americans, white and black, who were loyal to the 
Union during the Civil War.  Part II provides context by offering a brief history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Congress and discussing the various strategies open to Republicans and other 
constitutional framers for privileging fundamental rights, important interests and favored 
policies.  These strategies, which include efforts to create, constrain, construct, and constitute 
constitutional politics, are connected.  The creation and maintenance of a constitutional order 
requires self-conscious efforts to align a particular set of values, particular institutions that can 
achieve those values, and a people who must share those values and be capable of operating the 
institutions.23  Part III focuses on the constitutional misalignments that animated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in particular the threats the emerged after the Civil War to the continued hegemony 
of the Republican Party.  During the mid-nineteenth century, Martin Van Buren, Abraham 
Lincoln and others came to regard the legitimate party of the people as the institution ultimately 
                                                 
22 See notes ---, below, and the relevant text 
23 This is the central thesis of Stephen L. Elkin, Reconstructing the Commercial Republic: Constitutional Design 
after Madison (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2006). 
11 
 
responsible for preserving constitutional commitments and resolving constitutional disputes.  
The Republican Party was the means by which antislavery advocates sought to preserve what 
they perceived as the original antislavery commitments of the Constitution.  Republicans drafted 
the Fourteenth Amendment because they perceived a dire threat to theirparty’s capacity to 
control the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Most thought that Congress under the 
Thirteenth Amendment already had the constitutional powers necessary to promote the 
constitutional commitment to equality under law.  They feared that the Thirteenth Amendment, 
by permitting southern states to count disenfranchised persons of color as full persons for 
purposes of allocating representatives in Congress and votes in the Electoral College, might 
privilege the election of Democrats.  Democrats in power would repeal laws Republicans had 
passed under the Thirteenth Amendment, restore to a fair degree antebellum labor relations in the 
South and, when challenged, interpret in bad faith constitutional provisions intended to articulate 
a national commitment to equality under law.  Part IV discusses how Republicans responded to 
the threat of a revived Slave Power by drafting constitutional amendments that they believed 
would construct a constitutional politics that privileged the Republican Party.  Thaddeus Stevens 
and others made no distinction between constitutional right and partisan advantage because they 
believed that only Republicans were committed to the Union and fundamental constitutional 
values and because all Republicans needed to retain control of the national government was a 
constitutional politics that privileged the choices made by a majority of the people who remained 
loyal to the Union during the Civil War.  More concerned with the constitutional politics 
necessary to sustain egalitarian constitutional commitments than to constitutional law, 
Republicans devoted almost all of their attention to the language of Section 2 which they thought 
would secure black suffrage, and Section 3, which limited the influence of former Confederates 
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on national power.  John Bingham aside, very few members of Congress thought Section 1 
contributed much more than a restatement of existing constitutional commitments and fewer 
thought those commitments would survive in the absence of a constitutional politics structured to 
privilege the political party that championed those commitments.  Even fewer members 
discussed constitutional authority to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.  Republicans were 
concerned with maintaining their control over all national institutions.  Twenty-first century 
concerns with resolving constitutional disputes between different branches of the national 
government were not on the agenda, at least when the Fourteenth Amendment was on the table.  
Part V details why the Fourteenth Amendment failed and was superseded.  Crucial Republican 
representatives shortly after framing the Fourteenth Amendment lost interest in building a strong 
Republican Party in the South limiting the influence of southern whites on national policy in part 
because they perceived the party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War better 
secure voting majorities in the North retain sufficient control of the national government by 
admitting unpopulated western states that supported Republican candidates and servicing those 
white constituencies than by aggressively defending racial equality.  As both the Republican 
Party and Democratic Party lost their ideological edges, a new constitutional regime emerged.  In 
this political order, eventually entrenched by the New Deal, courts rather than parties became the 
institution most responsible for preserving constitutional commitments and resolving 
constitutional ambiguities.  Part VI concludes by briefly exploring the hold John Bingham has on 
contemporary American constitutionalism.  John Bingham’s Fourteenth Amendment is our 
Fourteenth Amendment.  His influence explains how Americans think about what the Fourteenth 
Amendment means, how we think about the way the Fourteenth Amendment is supposed to 
work, and why American constitutionalism is seeming committed to the very bizarre view that 
13 
 
the best way to change such bad constitutional decisions as Dred Scott is by changing the 
constitutional text rather than changing the constitutional decision makers.  Thaddeus Stevens 
knew otherwise, but too much constitutional history regards him as either a visionary committed 
to “forty acres and a mule”24and a racial bent “upon a policy of revenge and self-perpetuation,”25 
rather than the framer most concerned about the constitutional politics necessary the post-bellum 
constitutional commitment to equality under law. 
 Much of this paper compares and contrasts what Bingham and Stevens thought about 
how the Fourteenth Amendment should work.  Both supported similar texts.  Both agreed that 
the Constitution should include a substantive commitment to equality under law and enumerate 
certain fundamental rights and restrictions on government.  Both agreed that the way 
representatives were allocated needed to be adjusted in light of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
although Stevens pushed far harder than Bingham for black suffrage and restrictions on 
participation by former Confederates in national policy making.  What they disputed was the 
mechanisms by which the post-Civil War constitutional order would best secure an egalitarian, 
free labor regime.  Bingham consistently maintained that persons of color and southern Unionists 
were best protected by new enumerated rights and powers. Stevens insisted that former slaves 
and Southern unionists were best protected by a reconstructed constitutional politics.  John 
Bingham invented the Fourteenth Amendment of contemporary constitutional theory.26  Scholars 
interested in how the Fourteenth Amendment has actually worked for almost one-hundred and 
fifty years might nevertheless find Thaddeus Stevens more insightful, particularly if they want 
the Fourteenth Amendment to work differently than at present. 
                                                 
24 Foner 
25 McCloskey, p. 73. 
26  
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 Stevens teaches essential, but limited lessons.  His speeches on the floor of Congress 
serve as vital constitutional reminders that no scheme of constitutional rights and powers is likely 
to function unless complemented by a constitutional politics that privileges the values underlying 
those rights and powers.  The history of the Fourteenth Amendment highlights, however, the 
problems inherent in any effort to entrench any constitutional politics.  To begin with, as Stevens 
recognized, the scheme may not be adequate from the outset.  As important, constitutional 
politics inevitably changes in ways that confound the hopes of constitutional framers.  Both 
Madison’s vision of a partyless Constitution and Steven’s vision of a Constitution operated by an 
ideological Republican party began to fall apart within a decade.  The central problems of 
American constitutional theory, these examples suggest, are not simply to figure out how to align 
constitutional commitments and constitutional politics, but to figure out how governance can 
take place during the numerous periods on which constitutional commitments and constitutional 
politics are out of phase. 
 
II. Context 
 
Republicans when the Thirty-Ninth Congress met in December 1865 were presented with 
numerous options for protecting the fundamental rights of former slaves and preserving the fruits 
of the Union victory in the Civil War.  Some options were textual.  Republicans debated at 
length the precise language of proposed Fourteenth Amendments.  Other options were 
functional.  Republicans considered the various ways that constitutional language might achieve 
the goals of the successful antislavery movement.  The Fourteenth Amendment that the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction first proposed sought to construct constitutional politics by 
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depriving former slave states of substantial representation in Congress and the Electoral College 
unless they enfranchised persons of color.  The second Fourteenth Amendment that the Joint 
Committee proposed sought to constrain and create constitutional politics by enumerating 
additional congressional powers to restrict state legislatures from violating certain fundamental 
rights, most notably the right to equality before law.  The final version of the Fourteenth 
Amendment both constrained and constructed constitutional politics.  Section 1 and Section 4 
limited official power.  Section 2 and, to a lesser extent, Section 3 reconstructed constitutional 
politics.  The precise relationship between all five sections of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
not entirely clear, at least from a simple reading of the text.   
 
A. A Brief History of the Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment27 
 
The Thirty-Ninth Congress recognized that the Thirteenth Amendment did not provide an 
adequate constitutional foundation for Reconstruction.  Within days, House and Senate 
Republicans agreed to establish a Joint Committee on Reconstruction, chaired by Senator 
William Pitt Fessenden of Maine.  The Committee, which was composed of nine members of the 
House and six Senators was officially charged only with “inquir[ing] into the condition of the 
States which formed the so-called confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any 
of them, are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress.”28 Although members spent 
some time determining whether and when such states as Tennessee would be represented in 
Congress, the primary task of the Joint Committee was to serve as a clearinghouse for the 
                                                 
27 The best narrative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is Joseph B. James, The Framing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1956).  See also Benjamin Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint 
Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, 39th Congress, 1865-1867 (Negro Universities Press: New York, 1969). 
28 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 46. 
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numerous constitutional amendments being proposed by House and Senate Republicans.  
Republicans understood that, Tennessee aside, former Confederate states would not be 
represented in the national legislature until they approved whatever constitutional amendments 
the Joint Committee drafted and both houses of Congress approved. 
 The Joint Committee during the winter of 1866 unsuccessfully proposed two single-issue 
constitutional amendments.  The first Fourteenth Amendment the Joint Committee framed would 
adjust on the basis of representation in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College.  
That proposal declared,  
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed; 
provided that, whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any 
State on account of race, or color, all persons of such race or color, shall be 
excluded from the basis of representation.29 
 
After more than a month of debate, this Fourteenth Amendment was approved by the House of 
Representatives, but did not obtain the constitutionally mandated two-thirds vote in the Senate.  
Several prominent radicals, most notably Charles Sumner, objected to the inference that states 
could constitutionally disenfranchise persons of color.30  The proposed text, in their view, 
implicitly repealed preexisting voting rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Guaranty Clause of Article IV.31  While that proposal was being debated in the Senate, the Joint 
Committee presented Congress with a more substantive amendment, which declared: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal 
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.32 
 
                                                 
29 Benjamin B. Kendrick, “The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction,” p. 53 
30  
31  
32 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1034. 
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That proposal was tabled after two days of full debate in the House of Representatives.33 
 Rather than continue framing constitutional amendments piecemeal, the Joint Committee 
in the early spring, inspired by a draft put together by former congressman Robert Dale Owen,34 
combined various proposals into an omnibus constitutional amendment.  After a good deal of 
tinkering by the committee, members on April 30, 1865 presented the following Fourteenth 
Amendment to the House and Senate. 
Sec. 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.  
But whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of 
its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged 
except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in 
such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-one 
years of age. 
Sec. 3.  Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, all persons who 
voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, shall be 
excluded from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress, and for electors 
for President and Vice President of the United States. 
                                                 
33 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1095. 
34 The original Owen plan declared: 
 
 Section 1: No discrimination shall be made by any State, not by the United States, as the 
civil rights of persons, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
 Section 2.  From and after the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, no 
discrimination shall be made in any State nor by the United States, as to the enjoyment, by classes 
of persons, of the right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous condition or servitude. 
 Section 3. Until the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, no class of 
persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage, discrimination, shall be made by any State, 
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, shall be included in the basis of 
representation. 
 Section 4.  Debts incurred in aid of insurrection, or of war against the Union, and claims 
of compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor, shall not be paid by any State nor by the 
United States. 
 Section 5.  Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
 
James, Fourteenth Amendment, p. 100. 
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Sec. 4.  Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any 
debt or obligation already incurred, or which may hereafter be incurred, in aid of 
insurrection or of war against the United States, or any claim for compensation for 
loss of involuntary service or labor. 
Sec. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.35 
 
The House approved this Fourteenth Amendment on May 10, 1866, but the Senate balked in 
large part because of objections to Section 3.  In late May, after lengthy meetings of the Senate 
Republican caucus, the Joint Committee presented a rewritten omnibus amendment.  The Senate 
tinkered a bit with Section 2 and 4.  More serious revisions were made to Section 3.  Congress 
abandoned efforts to disenfranchise former Confederates and instead accepted a weaker 
provision restricting office holding.  On June 8, 1866, the upper house of Congress ratified the 
final version of the Fourteenth Amendment.36  The House followed suit on June 13, 1866.37  The 
final version of the Fourteenth Amendment declares: 
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
SECTION 2.  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at 
any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of 
a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which 
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such state. 
SECTION 3.  No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, 
                                                 
35 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2286.  See Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2265. 
36 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3042. 
37 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3148. 
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under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, 
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support 
the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
SECTION 4.  The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties 
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But 
neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim 
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and 
claims shall be held illegal and void. 
SECTION 5.  The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
 
 
B. Meaning and Doing in Constitutional Politics 
 
1. Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Interpretation 
 
Members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were engaged in constitutional politics when they 
drafted, revised, rejected and approved different Fourteenth Amendments.  They made choices 
between various means for privileging fundamental rights, vital interests and desired policies.  
These choices were informed by high political ideals and the political realities of American 
politics at the end of the Civil War.  While some debates in Congress were over the best 
interpretation of preexisting and proposed constitutional language, what Republicans did from 
December 1865 to June 1866 cannot be reduced to what the words they approved meant or 
mean.  All participants in constitutional politics, be they post-bellum Republicans, American 
revolutionaries or leaders of various Iraqi factions, seek to create or reconstruct a feasible politics 
that will faithfully implement enumerated constitutional rights and restrictions, as well as realize 
numerous other values that may or may not be set out explicitly in the text.  The study of 
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constitutional politics examines how constitutions were intended to work, actually work, and can 
be made to work better. 
The study of constitutional politics inevitably involves more traditional concerns about 
constitutional interpretation.38  How the Constitution was intended to work depends in part on 
what framers thought the text meant and how they expected that text to be interpreted.  How the 
Constitution actually works at the turn of the twenty-first century depends in part on what 
contemporary Americans think crucial constitutional provisions mean and on presently accepted 
methods of constitutional interpretation.  Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment could not 
influence on the constitutional regime if the language was gibberish.  The way judicial adherence 
to precedent helps structure constitutional decision making plays an important role in the present 
working of the Constitution.39  How the Constitution should work also depends in part on 
theories of constitutional interpretation.  The best method for interpreting a constitution designed 
to preserve the hard-won gains of the past differs from the best method for interpreting a 
“militant” constitution aimed at achieving some national aspiration.40   
Nevertheless, theories of constitutional politics encompass more phenomena than theories 
of constitutional interpretation41 or, for that matter, constitutional authority.42  What people do 
when they create, maintain, modify, or abandon constitutions differs from the meaning of the 
words they use when changing constitutional texts.  Constitutional reformers may be motivated 
by desires to pacify political opposition or gain international aid.  The Republicans who debated 
the Fourteenth Amendment were concerned with being reelected as well as with protecting 
                                                 
38 For a more elaborate discussion of the way constitutions work, see Graber, A New Introduction to American 
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former slaves and southern unionists.43  Constitutional reformers consider basic facts about the 
political and cultural life of their society when anticipating how enumerated rights will be 
interpreted and enumerated powers will be exercised.  Constitutional protections for freedom of 
religion in constitutional theocracies often transfer authority from sectarian prelates to secular 
judges.44  Madison thought Congress more likely to protect religious freedom than a state 
legislature.45  In sharp contrast to persons engaged in constitutional interpretation, persons 
thinking about constitutional politics consider the possibility that constitutional provisions will 
be misinterpreted.  Republicans made certain decisions when framing the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we shall see, because they feared a future constitutional politics in which a revived 
Democratic Party majority did not interpret in good faith the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Expectations play a different role in constitutional politics than in constitutional theory.  
Disputes rage among originalists over the precise role of original constitutional expectations 
when determining the meaning of constitutional provisions,46  but no one thinks that the common 
expectation that George Washington would become the first president gave Washington a 
constitutional right to that office.  Nevertheless, commentary on how the framers thought the 
presidency would work routinely notes the uniform expectation that George Washington would 
be the first president.47  This expectation had constitutional consequences.  The framers made 
constitutional choices in light of their expectation that George Washington would be the first 
                                                 
43 Foner; Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment, p. 58. 
44 Hirschl 
45 Federalist 10. 
46 Balkin; McGuiness and Rappaport. 
47 See Charles C. Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789: A Study in Constitutional History (Johns 
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD, 1922), p. 169. (“The fact that the first President was to be Washington 
had an undoubted effect”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, “Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the 
President’s Administrative Powers,” 102 Yale Law Journal 991, 995 (1993) (“Delegates at the Constitutional 
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chief executive would not be a tyrant whom the populace would have to fear, and the Constitution reflected this 
sanguine belief”). 
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president.  Pierce Butler, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, asserted, “I do 
[not] believe they [the executive powers] would have been so great, had not many of the 
members cast their eyes toward General Washington as President; and shaped their Ideas of the 
Powers to be given a President, by their opinions of his Virtue.”48  Had George Washington died 
in 1788, a fair probability exists that constitutional institutions would not have worked as the 
framers originally expected.  The problem would not be that office holders interpreted the 
Constitution wrongly, but that a crucial office holder making major constitutional decisions and 
establishing vital constitutional precedents lacked the expected values, interest, or stature. 
 
2. Strategies for Privileging Fundamental Rights, Vital Interests and Favored Policies 
 
Enumeration is one constitutional strategy framers use for privileging fundamental rights, 
vital interests and cherished policies.  The Constitution seeks to prevent an aristocracy and forbid 
persons from being boiled in oil in part through specific constitutional provisions that declare 
“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States,” “No State shall , , , grant any Title 
of Nobility,” and “nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  Constitutional provisions 
privilege certain rights, interests and policies by enumerating powers as well as enumerating 
rights.  Such provisions create rather than constraint constitutional politics.  The Constitution 
seeks to promote economic prosperity and the property rights of ocean travelers in part by 
constitutional provisions that authorize Congress to “regulate interstate commerce” and “punish 
Piracies and Felonies committee on the high Seas.”49  Enumerations may constrain or empower 
private actors as well as government officials.  The Thirteenth Amendment forbids one 
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individual from enslaving another.  Joseph Story interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause as 
authorizing slaveholders to exercise the common law right of recaption.50   
The persons responsible for the Constitution of the United States preferred to privilege 
what they perceived to be fundamental rights, vital interests and favored policies by constructing 
constitutional politics rather than by enumerated constitutional constraints or constitutional 
powers.51  Prominent framers insisted that well-designed constitutional institutions were a better 
means for preserving liberty than precise descriptions of constitutional powers and limits.  As 
arguably the single most important assertion in the Federalist states, “all observations founded 
upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the 
government, not to the nature or extent of its powers.”52  Federalist 10 famously asserts that an 
extended republic is the best constitutional means for securing proper rights and protecting 
religious freedom.   “Extend the sphere,” Madison declared, “and you take in a greater variety of 
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more 
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each 
other.”53  
Constitutional reformers have various goals in mind when proposing constitutional 
provisions that construct constitutional politics.  Some constitutional provisions are best 
understood as vital companions to enumerated rights and restrictions.  They are designed to 
construct a constitutional politics in which those constitutional constraints are obeyed and 
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enforced.  The Supreme Court may be structured to ensure that governing officials respect clear 
constitutional limits on their powers.  Other constitutional provisions help construct a 
constitutional politics that privileges certain outcomes among choices constitutionally open to 
government officials.  The Constitution permits Congress to set whatever income tax rates the 
national legislators think best.  Nevertheless, to the extent that business has a privilege position 
in constitutional politics,54 Congress is unlikely to choose tax rates unduly burdensome to the 
investor class.    Still, other constitutional provisions influence how ambiguous constitutional 
provisions are interpreted.  Framers may not agree among themselves on what constitutes a 
regulation of commerce or the free exercise of religion.  Rather than resolve their differences 
through clearer language, they may prefer to structure government institutions so that crucial 
future constitutional-decision makers will interpret broad constitutional commands consistently 
with the best theory of justice or those values that unite members of the Blue Party.  Rather than 
provide many constitutional protections for slavery, the persons responsible for the Constitution 
designed a political system they believed in practice would guarantee a united coalition of slave 
states a veto on national policy.55 
Constitutional reformers may also seek to realize their goals by constituting constitutional 
politics.  They do so when championing constitutional provisions that they believe will help 
fashion a citizenry with certain values and interests.  Madison was seeking to constitute 
constitutional politics when he informed the First Congress that constitutional declaration of 
rights “have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public 
opinion in their favor.”56  The Constitution, in this view, plays a crucial role in the process by 
which Americans are socialized to respect such rights as the freedom of religion.  To the extent 
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popular majorities and political leaders by habit do not even think of burning heretics, 
institutional precautions against an American Inquisition are unnecessary.  Madison in the 
Federalist maintained other basic constitutional goals could be achieved only if constitutional 
practices promoted deep, widespread, and often unthinking, constitutional commitments.  
Constitutional change should be difficult, he asserted, because “as every appeal to the people 
would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great 
measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and 
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite 
stability.”57 
The way constitutions work by constraining, creating, and constructing constitutional 
politics does not map neatly on to common distinctions between rights, powers, and procedures.  
Some rights both constraint and construct politics.  The framers thought jury trials were vital 
means for privileging property and speech rights.58  Some procedures may be valued for their 
own sake rather than any tendency to bias politics in any way.  People may favor majority rule 
solely because they believe majorities have a right to rule, and not because they believe that 
institutions yoked to majoritarian sentiment in their society are more likely to make particular 
policies than other institutional arrangements.59 
With the important exception of façade constitutions whose framers have little interest in 
actually implementing textual declarations60 constitutions typically privilege favored rights, 
                                                 
57 Federalist 49. 
58 Cite to Stuntz 
59 Cite to Waldron.  The way in which constitutions constraint, create and construct politics also does not map neatly 
on to Sandy Levinson’s important distinction between the “Constitution of Conversation” and the “Constitutional of 
Settlement.”  See Framed. Constitutional provisions designed to construct constitutional politics have a tendency to 
be more definite than enumerated constitutional rights, restrictions and powers, but numerous exceptions exist.  The 
constitutional clause prohibiting titles of nobility has generated little if any conversation.  The judicial power to 
interpret the Constitution is perhaps the most discussion feature of the “Constitution of Conversation.” 
60 For a discussion of façade constitutions, see Sartori, “Constitutionalism,” p. FIND 
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important interests, and desired policies through a combination of enumeration and institutional 
design.  Constitutional politics is created, constrained and constructed.  The way in which the 
Constitution protects the independent influence of state governments illustrates this interaction of 
constitutional text and constitutional politics. Article I, Section 3 requires state equality in the 
Senate.  The framers assumed that senators interested in preserving their power and the power of 
their home states would have the interests necessary to act consistently to preserve the vital 
interests of states as states (including state equality in the Senate).61  Federalist 45 details how 
by constructing a constitutional politics in which states were involved in the selection of every 
national elected official, the Constitution provided additional security for state governments.   
Traditional state functions were safe in the new constitutional order, Madison wrote, because 
“each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to 
the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much 
more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them.”62  
Madison was confident that a similar combination of text and institutional design would 
construct a rights-protecting constitutional politics.  In his speech introducing the Bill of Rights, 
Madison pointed to several features of constitutional politics that he believed would make 
enumerated rights effective.  In his view, both the federal judiciary and state governments were 
structured in ways conducive to protecting enumerated constitutional rights.  “If they are 
incorporated into the constitution,” Madison argued on the floor of Congress, “independent 
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those 
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rights.”63  The Bill of Rights, he continued, would also enable “state legislatures . . . to resist 
with more effect every assumption of power.”64 
 The persons responsible for the Constitution derisively referred to as “parchment 
barriers” enumerated rights and restrictions that had no foundation in the underlying 
constitutional politics.  Their past experience demonstrated that clear constitutional guidelines, 
standing alone, did not restrain officials bent on unconstitutional usurpations. Roger Sherman 
informed New Englanders that “[n]o bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer than 
the honeymoon of a new married couple, unless the rulers were interested in preserving the 
rights.”  Government officials and popular majorities were free to rescind parchment barriers to 
their preferred policies. “Neither would a general declaration of rights be any security,” Civic 
Rusticus wrote, “for the sovereign who made it could repeal it.”65  
Parchment is hardly worthless or a unique to enumeration.  Constitutional provisions 
detailing the “composition and structure of government” have the same potential to become 
parchment barriers as constitutional provisions protecting the freedom of speech.  The crucial 
point is that the framers in 1787 and the Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
recognized that constitutions do not function by pure textual fiat.  Enumerated constitutional 
restrictions are respected and enumerated constitutional powers are exercised only when they are 
supported by the underlying constitutional politics.  What constitutions mean in practice is a 
function of text, institutions or and the political culture.  The Thirteenth Amendment was likely 
to abolish slavery only to the extent that the textual ban on human bondage provided antislavery 
activists who controlled crucial government institutions with powers they believed they formerly 
lacked, enabled antislavery activists to control crucial government institutions by fostering a 
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constitutional culture increasingly committed to the abolition of slavery, or compelled persons 
who favored slavery to nevertheless act consistently with this new constitutional provision. 
 Stephen Elkin provides the fundamental matrix for studying constitutional politics when 
he observes that constitutional orders consist of a set of basic values, institutions that are 
designed to realize those values, and a people who share those values and are capable of 
operating the institutions.66   Constitutional reformers seek to align these values, institutions, and 
people.  In some cases, constitutional reforms are directed either at introducing new 
constitutional values or emphasizing preexisting constitutional commitments that advocates are 
confident have or will soon have broad popular and institutional support.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment, which committed the United States to the immediate abolition of slavery, reformed 
or reasserted fundamental constitutional values.  At least as often, constitution reformers attempt 
to construct a constitutional politics that will better achieve what they perceive as preexisting 
constitutional commitments.  The Eleventh Amendment reflected preexisting commitments to 
state sovereignty that proponents believed were abandoned in Chisholm v. Georgia.67  Reformers 
may prefer informal constitutional changes to amending the constitutional text as the means for 
constructing a better constitutional politics. 68 Martin Van Buren and the founders of mass party 
politics in the United States invented the legitimate party of the people to be a substitute for 
checks and balances as a vital means for preserving the constitutional regime they believed was 
founded in 1787.69  
 The Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were well aware that 
constitutions could malfunction because of misalignments between constitutional values and 
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constitutional politics.  They had witnessed such a malfunction during the decades immediately 
before the Civil War.  Antislavery advocates routinely complained about an aristocratic Slave 
Power they believed was governing the United States in defiance of constitutional commitments 
to majoritarianism and the eventual abolition of slavery.  Charles Sumner and others accused the 
Slave Power of transforming into a parchment barrier the constitutional right alleged fugitive 
slaves enjoyed to a jury trial.  Many Republicans charged that Slave Power aristocrats and their 
northern doughface sycophants were perverting national powers, most notably the congressional 
power to govern the territories, by adopting policies designed to entrench slavery rather than to 
place human bondage on the “path of ultimate extinction” as intended by the Constitution.  
During and immediately after the Civil War, Republicans took advantage of the absence of 
southern representatives in Congress and the Electoral College first to recommit the Constitution 
to the ultimate abolition of slavery and then to commit the Constitution to the actual abolition of 
slavery.  The challenge Republicans faced in the first winter after the end of the Civil War was 
how constitutional politics could be reconstructed so that when southern officials returned to 
Congress and the Electoral College, the Thirteenth Amendment did not become another 
parchment barrier. 
 
III. Constitutional Failures: Past and Future 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Constitution was built on the ruins of the Constitution of 
1789.  Republicans before the Civil War celebrated what they perceived was the original 
constitutional commitment to the “ultimate extinction in slavery.”70  The problem, in their view, 
was that constitutional politics was no longer structured to achieve that end.  A mismatch had 
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developed between constitutional purposes and constitutional institutions that explained why 
crucial national decisions during the 1840s and 1850s entrenched human bondage in the United 
States.  Antislavery advocates condemned such decisions as Dred Scott v. Sandford, which 
forbade legislation banning slavery in American territories, as outrageous denials of the 
fundamental antislavery norms of the Constitution.  Horace Greeley maintained the decision was 
“entitled to just so much moral weight as would be the judgment of a majority of those 
congregated in any Washington barroom.”71  Greeley and other Republican critics of Taney 
Court jurisprudence in slavery cases recognized that the problem was not simply that a few 
aberrant justices were not being constrained by constitutional rules.  Rather, they insisted that 
such pro-slavery rulings as Dred Scott and Prigg v. Pennsylvania72 were rooted in a 
constitutional politics constructed to privileged the interests of a southern aristocracy. A Slave 
Power had arisen that was taking advantage of constitutional forms to pervert both the 
majoritarian and antislavery commitments of the Constitution.  Slave Power agents in the judicial 
decided Dred Scott, in the legislature passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and in the executive 
fought to make Kansas a slave state.  In order to combat this constitutional conspiracy, 
antislavery advocates had to organize a political party dedicated to restoring the original 
constitutional understanding of slavery.  Americans would become recommitted to the animating 
purpose of the Constitution of 1787, Republicans realized, only by imitating Democrats who had 
abandoned the antipartisan constitutional politics the framers had thought necessary for 
achieving vital constitutional ends.   
The Republican Party was the main vehicle by which antislavery advocates before and 
after the Civil War sought to reconstruct a more favorable constitutional politics.  By organizing 
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a political party and maintaining party discipline, antislavery advocates confirmed the most 
important constitutional innovation of the mid-nineteenth century.  The framers believed that 
individual rights and the public interest could be secured only if government was rooted in a 
complex system of checks and balances that prevented the rise of political parties.  Jacksonians, 
by comparison, insisted that individual rights and the public interest could be secured only if 
ordinary Americans united in a political party that gave them the strength to resist various 
oligarchies bent on perverting constitutional forms and values.  Martin Van Buren understood 
that what he perceived to be the original constitutional commitments to limited government and 
federalism could be restored only if ordinary citizens in the all sections of the country united in a 
political party and gained control over all national institutions.  Abraham Lincoln understood that 
what he perceived to be the original constitutional commitment to the end of slavery could be 
restored only if the free citizens of the North united in a political party and gained control over 
all national institutions.  These united parties, Van Buren and Lincoln thought, were both the 
main vehicle by which constitutional values were preserved and the main vehicle by which 
constitutional disputes among the faithful were resolved. 
Post-Civil War constitutional politics threatened the Republican majority that gained 
control of the national government in 1860.  Prior to the Civil War, the Slave Power was able to 
dominant the national government in part because the three-fifths clause augmented southern 
representation in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College. The Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery, promised to increase southern representation in Congress 
and the Electoral College, as disenfranchised persons of color would now count as full persons 
when seats in the House and votes in the Electoral College were allocated.  Republicans who 
journeyed south heard former slaveowners publicly brag about how, with the aid of this 
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enhanced representation and northern Democrats, they would soon again control the national 
government, establish near slave-like systems of labor, and force northern taxpayers to assume 
southern debts incurred during the Civil War.  
The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to alleviate Republican fears that post-Civil 
War constitutional politics might privilege a revived Slave Power rather than Republican 
concerns that the national government lacked the constitutional power to prohibit the Black 
Codes that were being enacted throughout the post-Civil War South.  As the passage and defense 
of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Second Freedman’s Bureau Act demonstrate, the 
vast majority of Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress believed Congress was authorized by 
the Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions, most notably the Guaranty 
Clause of Article IV, to prohibit most if not all forms of race discrimination.  Republicans knew, 
however, that Democrats in power would either prevent anti-discrimination legislation from 
becoming law or repeal such legislation on the books.  The problem they faced when the Thirty-
Ninth Congress met was that the same Thirteenth Amendment that gave Republicans who 
controlled the national government the power to promote equality under law also provided 
Democrats with a golden opportunity to regain control over the national government and 
dismantle the Republican program.  With the very important exception of John Bingham, 
Republicans in and out of Congress consistently regarded the threat to their constitutional vision 
as coming from the way the Thirteenth Amendment altered structure of constitutional politics 
rather than any inadequacies in the rights and powers to protect those rights enumerated by the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  
The Fourteenth Amendment was the culmination of a constitutional transformation from 
a regime designed to rely on a constitutional politics that prevented the rise of parties to preserve 
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fundamental constitutional commitments to a regime that relied on a particular political party to 
preserve those values.  The transformation began in the 1820s, when Jacksonian political 
thinkers began to legitimate a permanent political party as the best means to parry aristocratic 
threats to the democratic and substantive commitments of the original Constitution.  
Republicans, while rejecting the pro-slavery commitments of the Democracy, nevertheless 
endorsed Martin Van Buren’s claim that a permanent political party was the only means to parry 
aristocratic threats to the democratic and substantive commitments of the original Constitution.  
Democrats and Republicans differed only in their understanding of the aristocratic threats to the 
constitutional order.  Van Buren and Andrew Jackson fought the Money Power.  Lincoln and 
Thaddeus Stevens fought the Slave Power.  A constitutional amendment was necessary in 1866, 
the Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress agreed, in order to thwart renewed 
aristocratic threats to the capacity of rightful sovereigns of the United States, the party of the 
people who remained loyal during the Civil War, to maintain basic constitutional values and to 
interpret constitutional ambiguities in light to these commitments. 
 
 
A. Parties and the Mid-Nineteenth Constitutional Order 
 
 Americans during the mid-nineteenth century increasing regarded party as a necessary 
means for preserving the Constitution and the appropriate vehicle for resolving constitutional 
disputes.  By forming a political party and accepting party discipline, such partisans as Martin 
Van Buren and Abraham Lincoln insisted, ordinary citizens could prevent elite factions from 
gaining control of the national government and perverting the constitutional order.  contrast to 
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the framers, who believed a sharp separation of powers necessary for preventing the tyranny of 
the majority, leading constitutional practitioners after 1830 maintained that concentrated power 
within a legitimate political party was necessary for preventing powerful minorities from seizing 
control of the national government and subsequently exercising national power to advance their 
narrow self-interest.  Mass parties composed of ordinary citizens inhibited a constitutional 
politics that favored either “the Money Power” or “the Slave Power.” These aristocratic cabals in 
late Jacksonian America were seen as far greater threats to the constitutional order than the 
popular majorities Madison feared might redistribute property or impose a religious orthodoxy. 
Martin Van Buren, Abraham Lincoln, and other partisan activists substituted a legitimate 
party, not a two-party system, for the separation of powers as the means for preserving American 
constitutional commitments.  As Gerald Leonard and Stephen Engel in particular have pointed 
out,73 the Jacksonian leaders who abandoned the founding commitment to a “Constitution 
Against Parties”74 defended the legitimate party of the people.  They did not wax eloquent on the 
virtues of competition between two or more parties for public offices.  Democrats explained why 
the Democracy was the only means for preventing the Money Power from controlling the 
national government.  Whigs explained why a counter coalition was the only means for 
preventing Jacksonian spoilsmen from controlling the national government.  Several decades 
later, Republicans explained why their sectional party was the only means for preventing the 
Slave Power from controlling the national government.   Although a few prominent politicians 
during the mid-nineteenth century praised two-party politics,75 the legitimacy of competition 
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between political parties or a party system was, at most, unclear when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was being framed.76 
 
1. The Constitutional Mission of Parties 
 
 Martin Van Buren, the acknowledged architect of the nineteenth century American 
constitutional order, had a profound, unrecognized influence on the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Van Buren is well known as the founder of permanent political parties in the United States.  The 
primary mission of those parties was not, as sometimes supposed, “to solve the knotty 
operational problems of governing under the Constitution.”77  Rather, Van Buren regarded a 
permanent party as the best means for preserving the Constitution.  Unless ordinary people 
organized, he and the other founders of party politics in the United States believed, elites would 
gain power, substitute minority rule for the perceived constitutional commitment to 
majoritarianism, and frustrate more substantive constitutional purposes.  The Republicans who 
framed the Fourteenth Amendment were animated by this partisan vision, even as they revised 
Van Buren’s conceptions of the popular majority, the aristocratic threat to that majority, and the 
most vital constitutional purposes.  
                                                                                                                                                             
public affairs were never better administered than during the [Jefferson administration] when measures were 
proposed and advocated by the majority, under the vigilance and correction of the minority. . . .  [T]he conflict of 
parties is a noble conflict—of mind to mind, genius to genius”). 
76 Professor Leonard asserts with great force that Americans in the Jacksonian Eradid not support a party system or 
accept the legitimacy of rival parties.  Leonard correct notes that both Jacksonian Democrats and Whigs sought to 
obliterate the other and frequently called rival parties illegitimate.  The same could be said, however, about 
contemporary Democrats and Republicans.  A the very least, both Whigs and Jacksonians seemed to accept, often 
very grudgingly, that contrary constitutional visions enacted by duly elected or appointed officials were the law of 
the land.  The important distinction between contemporary politics and that of the mid-nineteenth, on which Leonard 
is an exceptional guide is that the dominant justifications in Jacksonian Era focused on the legitimacy of a particular 
political party.  Jacksonians were far less interested, if interested at all, in praising a party system. 
77 Skowronek, Building a New American State, p. 24. 
36 
 
A legitimate political party, before and after the Civil War, was entrusted with related 
procedural and constitutional missions.  By mobilizing ordinary citizens, the legitimate party of 
the people prevented constitutional politics from being controlled by a political, economic or 
sectional aristocracy.  By keeping that aristocracy out of power, the legitimate party of the 
people ensured that the Constitution was interpreted consistently with the goals of the founders.  
Party organization and party discipline fostered a constitutional politics in which Americans 
were governed by the persons or combination of persons that the Constitution authorized to 
govern and consistently with the values the Constitution was designed to promote. 
 Martin Van Buren’s Democratic Party was organized on the basis of these constitutional 
principles.  Van Buren and his allies regarded the Democracy as the only means by which “the 
Money Power” could be prevented from perverting the constitutional order.  Through 
organization, Democrats ensured that public offices remained in the hands of those persons who 
had the best interests of ordinary persons at heart rather than those who sought to advance the 
interest of the investor class.  Democrats in power could be trusted to resist aristocratic attempts 
to entrench the “latitudinarian” construction of the Constitution underlying federal support for 
the national bank and internal improvements, legislation that further enriched the affluent class 
and enfeebled those institutions, most notably local government, that best enabled ordinary 
citizens to maintain control of the national government. 
 The Whig Party over time adopted this Jacksonian interpretation of the constitutional 
mission of political parties. Party organization was necessary, such prominent Whigs as 
Abraham Lincoln believed,78 in order to alleviate the threat that elite Democrat office-holders 
presented to the constitutional order.  Whigs would preserve constitutional order by replacing 
Jacksonian placemen, who were concerned only with gaining office and enjoying the spoils of 
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government, with virtuous, independent statespersons who would govern as the framers 
intended, in the public interest.  Those who governed in the public interest, in turn, would adopt 
a generous construction of national powers in order to fulfill constitutional commitments to an 
improved citizenry.79 
 The antislavery advocates who formed the Republican Party wholeheartedly adopted the 
Jacksonian understanding of a legitimate political party, while substituting “the Slave Power” for 
“the Money Power” as the central threat to constitutional politics and making the free people of 
the North, later the people who remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War, as the rightful 
sovereigns in the United States.  Political organization was necessary because the Slave Power 
rejected the fundamental majoritarian commitments of the Constitution.  Slaveholders governed 
the south undemocratically and controlled the national government only because a combination 
of this undemocratic rule at home, the three-fifths clause, northerners bent on receiving spoils 
and various other schemes inimical to popular government had generated a constitutional politics 
that privileged southern interests.  Slaveholders in control of the national government, in turn, 
warped the original constitutional commitment to restraining the spread of slavery.  Every good 
Republican connected the procedural and substantive dots that held the Slave Power together.  If 
through organization the Republican Party restored the original constitutional commitment to 
majority rule, they were convinced, then that procedural success would result in a constitutional 
politics that again privileged the original antislavery commitments of the constitutional order. 
 
2. Constitutional Authority in the Partisan Regime 
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The partisan theory of constitutional authority that Van Buren developed and Lincoln 
advanced in his first inaugural diverged from the antipartisan theory of constitutional authority 
that Jefferson championed and made famous.  Although Jefferson and Lincoln’s works are 
commonly cited as the canonical expressions of departmentalism,80 their challenges to judicial 
theory were rooted in different conceptions of constitutional politics.  Jefferson was a 
departmentalist.  His theory of constitutional authority was rooted in the Madisonian 
understanding that liberty was best preserved by constitutional arrangements that enabled 
different governmental institutions to check each other.  Lincoln was not a departmentalist.  His 
theory of constitutional authority was rooted in the Van Burenite understanding that liberty was 
best preserved by constitutional arrangements that enabled the legitimate party of the people to 
control the entire government. 
 The Constitution of 1789 sought to privilege the public interest and minority rights 
through institutional arrangements that guaranteed the independence of distinctive governing 
institutions.  Madison in Federalist 51 maintained that constitutional commitments could be 
secured only if each branch of national government had the capacity to resist the other branches.  
“The several constituent parts” of the federal government, he wrote, must have “the means of 
keeping each other in their proper places.”81  In his view, national power would be limited in 
practice only if the Constitution was designed so “that each department should have a will of its 
own.”82  Jefferson was as committed to the separation of powers as the bulwark of freedom.  His 
Notes on the State of Virginia criticized the new Constitution of Virginia because “all the powers 
of government, legislative, executive, and the judiciary result to the legislative body.”  In his 
view, “The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic 
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government.  It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, 
and not by a single one.  One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive 
as one.”83   
Fragmenting political power was crucial to the founding effort to prevent the rise of 
political parties, which they believed would undermine vital constitutional commitments.  Both 
Madison and Jefferson celebrated the separation of powers in part because they believed 
completion between balanced government institutions for power would inhibit competition 
between political parties for power.84  Madison thought large republics promoted liberty by 
inhibiting cooperation between potential members of a faction.85 
 Jefferson and Madison opposed judicial supremacy because they believed a judicial 
monopoly violated the institutional independence they thought vital for security republican 
liberty.  Both relied extensively on separation of powers logic when defending departmentalism.  
Jefferson informed Abigail Adams: 
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of the 
sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to decide for 
the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magistracies 
are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them. The judges, 
believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and 
imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by the Constitution. 
But the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit 
the execution of it; because that power has been confided to him by the 
Constitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be 
checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide 
what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their own 
sphere of action, but for the Legislature & Executive also, in their spheres, would 
make the judiciary a despotic branch.86 
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Madison’s departmentalism was similarly yoked to the separation of powers. Responding to 
suggestions during the First Congress to refer questions about the power of the president to 
cashier cabinet members to the Supreme Court, Madison declared, 
I beg to know, upon what principle it can be contended, that any one department 
draws from the constitution greater powers than another, in marking out the limits 
of the powers of the several departments. The constitution is the charter of the 
people to the government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted, 
and marks out the departments to exercise them. If the constitutional boundary of 
either be brought into question, I do not see that any one of these independent 
departments has more right than another to declare their sentiments on that 
point.87 
 
 Constitutional authority, for Jefferson and Madison, was rooted in office-holding rather 
than elections.  Members of Congress, the president and Supreme Court justices had the right to 
interpret the Constitution independently because their offices were designed to be independent.  
Elections played, at most, a secondary role in the means by which constitutional disputes were 
resolved.  Jefferson did observe that “when the legislative or executive functionaries act 
unconstitutionally, they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity.”88  Nevertheless, 
Jefferson when defending departmentalism never claimed that an official had constitutional 
authority because that official was elected and, hence, might be trusted to act consistently with 
popular interpretations of constitutional provisions.  Madison explicitly rejected popular 
constitutionalism.  After declaring in Federalist 49 that “The several departments being perfectly 
coordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evidence, can pretend 
to an exclusive or superior right to settling the boundaries between their respective powers,” he 
promptly raised “insuperable objections against . . . recurrence to the people” as the appropriate 
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means for resolving constitutional controversies between the different branches of the national 
government.89 
 Martin Van Buren accepted some elements of the separation of powers logic underlying 
the Madisonian understanding of constitutional politics.  His analysis of constitutional authority 
in his Inquiry into the Origins and Course of Political Parties in the United States began by 
endorsing Jefferson’s conception of departmentalism.90  After quoting Jefferson at length, Van 
Buren argued that President Andrew Jackson’s famous message vetoing the national bank bill91 
had justified presidential authority to interpret the Constitution on classical separation of powers 
logic.  Van Buren maintained that Jackson’s message asserted the following core propositions of 
departmentalism: 
That the Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by 
its own opinions of the Constitution. . . .  That the opinion of the judges has no 
more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, 
and that on that point the President is independent of both. . .  That the authority 
of the Supreme Court should not therefore be permitted to control the Congress or 
the Executive, when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such 
influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.92 
 
Other passages of the Inquiry repeated this Jeffersonian departmentalist understanding of 
constitutional authority.  Van Buren asserted, “The provisions of the Constitution will be 
searched in vain for any which indicate a design on the part of its framers to give to one of the 
departments power to control the action of another in respect to its departmental duties under that 
instrument.”93 
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 Van Buren broke from Jefferson and Madison when discussing the role parties and 
elections played resolving constitutional disputes between the different branches of the national 
government.  Madison and Jefferson assumed that government could function when the 
legislature, executive and judiciary acted on distinctive constitutional understandings.  Van 
Buren insisted these disputes be resolved and that popular majorities were the ultimate 
constitutional decision makers when governing officials could not settle constitutional 
controversies.  “The true view of the Constitution,” he declared, was 
If different interpretations are put upon the Constitution by the different 
departments, the people is the tribunal to settle the dispute.  Each of the 
departments is the agent of the people, doing their business according to the 
powers conferred; and where there is a disagreement as to the extent of these 
powers, the people themselves, through the ballot-boxes, must settle it.94 
 
More so than Jefferson or Madison, Van Buren emphasized that judicial supremacy was 
inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to majoritarianism.  Placing constitutional 
authority “under the supervision” of federal courts, he stated, “is nothing less than to divest the 
Government of its republican features and to substitute in its place the control of an irresponsible 
judicial oligarchy—to make the Constitution a lie, and turn to mockery its most formal 
provisions, designed to secure to the people a control over the action of the Government under its 
authority.”95 
 Lincoln’s discussions of constitutional authority in his debates with Douglas and first 
inaugural relied entirely on party, cutting out all references to the separation of powers.  His 
challenge to judicial authority in 1858 was issued as a member of the Republican Party, not as an 
office holder or potential holder of a particular federal office.  Lincoln’s analysis of 
constitutional authority in his sixth debate with Stephen Douglas occurred during when he 
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discussed the “principles”96 of the Republican Party.  Speaking as a member of the Republican 
Party, he stated, 
We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps 
to address you a few words. We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been 
decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob will decide him to be free. We do 
not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that 
court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus 
settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule which shall 
be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be 
binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that 
does not actually concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to 
be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the 
foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, 
but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the States themselves. We 
propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule 
established upon this subject.97 
 
This passage defends the right of Republican Party members to campaign on a platform 
committed to prohibiting slavery in the territories and act on that platform if elected to office. 
While Lincoln spoke about members of Congress and the President exercising independent 
judgment on constitutional questions, that independence stemmed from their status as elected 
officials rather than holders of a particular office. At no point when campaigning for the Senate 
or presidency did Lincoln invoke separation of powers logic as justifying congressional or 
executive challenges to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott.  His Republican Party was 
organized for the purpose of making their contrary constitutional vision the law of the land by 
controlling all three branches of government, thus obviating separation of powers as a 
meaningful constraint on national authority or conception for thinking about constitutional 
authority. 
 Lincoln’s analysis of constitutional authority in the Lincoln-Douglas debates was 
consistent with the Republican critique of Dred Scott as an instance of constitutional 
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partisanship.  Republicans rarely criticized Dred Scott for being countermajoritarian.98  Instead, 
antislavery advocates sought to link the judicial decision that slavery could not be banned in 
American territories with the Slave Power and northern doughfaces.  The antislavery New York 
Herald, when commenting on Dred Scott asserted, “At present, the South is strongly fortified.  It 
has the administration, both houses of Congress and the Supreme Court as its constitutional 
defenses.”99  Lincoln connected the Jacksonian majority in the federal judiciary with the 
Jacksonian majority in the elected branches of the national government.  “The Dred Scott 
decision,” he asserted, “never would have been made in its present form if the party that made it 
had not been sustained previously by the elections.”100 Republicans who regarded Dred Scott as 
a consequence of Slave Power control of the national government thought pointless the 
Jeffersonian commitment to having each branch of the national government exercise independent 
constitutional authority.  If, as Lincoln declared, “James” Buchanan, “Roger” Taney, and 
“Stephen” Douglas were involved in a conspiracy to pervert the constitutional commitment to 
the end of slavery,101 adjusting the allocation of constitutional authority would change nothing.  
Instead, antislavery advocates claimed that persons committed to reversing Dred Scott should 
attempt to replace Democratic Party officials in all three branches of the national government 
with members of the Republican Party.  Lincoln’s speech during the fifth debate with Douglas 
endorsed Van Buren’s understanding that majority rule was the means by which constitutional 
disputes were appropriately settled.  He stated, “My own opinion is, that the new Dred Scott 
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decision, deciding against the right of the people of the States to exclude slavery, will never be 
made, if that party is not sustained by the elections.”102 
 Lincoln’s first inaugural address built on his previous commitments to party as the main 
vehicle of constitutional authority.  That speech began by noting that the Constitution did not 
explicitly resolve certain questions, most notably questions about the constitutional status of 
slavery in the territories.  Lincoln then observed that Americans formed parties when attempting 
to gain favorable resolution of these open constitutional questions.  “From questions of this class 
spring all our constitutional controversies,” he asserted, “and we divide upon them into 
majorities and minorities.”  After articulating the constitutional mission of political parties, 
Lincoln insisted on majority rule as the proper means for resolving constitutional disputes.    
Lincoln made no reference to the power of the president or the right of any person holding a 
particular government office to challenge Supreme Court decisions or engage in independent 
constitutional decision-making.  Constitutional authority rested in the hands of the majority 
party.  Lincoln’s first inaugural asserted: 
A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks, and limitations, and always 
changing easily, with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is 
the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly 
to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a 
permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissable; so that, rejecting the majority 
principle, anarchy, or despotism in some form, is all that is left.  
 
 Lincoln’s famous attack on judicial supremacy came immediately after he insisted that 
popular majorities were the ultimate constitutional authority in the United States.  Dred Scott did 
not permanently settle the constitutional status of slavery in the territories because “the candid 
citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the 
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are 
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made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to 
be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands 
of that eminent tribunal.”  Following Van Buren, Lincoln in his first inaugural referred to “the 
people” as the ultimate constitutional authority.  At no point in his debates with Douglas, in his 
first inaugural, or in any other public remark delivered previous to the First Inaugural, did 
Lincoln claim that Article II or the constitutional separation of powers justified an executive 
decision to act inconsistently with the principles underlying the judicial decision in Dred Scott.  
Lincoln, if elected Senator or President, was constitutionally authorized to support bans on 
slavery in American territories because he was a member of the majority party that had gained 
office campaigning on a platform dedicated to the principle that national officials had the 
constitutional power and the constitutional obligation to ban slavery in the territories. 
 The theory of constitutional authority Lincoln articulated in the first inaugural and 
debates with Douglas differed sharply from that espoused by Jefferson and Madison.  Lincoln 
believed constitutional authority vested in the party of the people, while Jefferson and Madison 
maintained that constitutional authority was vested in governing institutions.  Elections played a 
far more crucial role in Lincoln’s understanding of constitutional authority than in Jefferson’s 
departmentalism.  Jefferson maintained that he had a right to independent constitutional authority 
solely because he was president.  His departmentalist conception of constitutional authority was 
rooted in the framing understanding that elections were about electing the best men for public 
office rather than making fundamental policy choices.103  When justifying his decision to pardon 
persons convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts, Jefferson never claimed authority to do so 
because he and other Democratic-Republicans in 1800 had successfully campaigned on a 
platform committed to repealing Federalist restrictions on free speech. By comparison, elections 
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are at the center of the theory of constitutional authority Lincoln inherited from Van Buren.  
Andrew Jackson when claiming constitutional authority to remove deposits from the national 
bank emphasized that his constitutional opposition to the national bank had been sustained by 
popular majorities in the 1832 Presidential election.104  Lincoln similarly insisted that 
Republicans were constitutionally authorized to ban slavery in the territories because they had 
campaigned on that issue and won the 1860 national election.  Justifying his decision not to 
abandon campaign pledges to restrict the expansion of slavery, Lincoln stated, “when ballots 
have fairly, and constitutionally, decided, there can be no successful appeal, back to bullets; 
that there can be no successful appeal, except to ballots themselves, at succeeding elections.”105 
“Electoral winners, Lincoln and Andrew Jackson agreed, were constitutionally authorized to 
interpret the Constitution consistently with their advertised constitutional vision. 
 These differences between Lincoln and Jefferson help explain why the first inaugural 
does not neatly map on to a theory of judicial supremacy, of departmentalism, or of any other 
contemporary model of constitutional authority.  These common theories of constitutional 
authority are all grounded in claims that the separation of powers is vital for the maintenance of 
liberty.106  Proponents of departmentalism, legislative supremacy, judicial supremacy, and 
compact theory assign distinctive functions to the different branches of the national government.  
They debate what balance of constitutional authority best maintains these distinctive functions, 
so that a separation of powers system may promote constitutional commitments and uphold 
constitutional restrictions.107  Mid-Nineteenth century Americans who defended partisan 
supremacy believed that constitutional commitments were best secured when the legitimate party 
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of the people gained control of all three branches of the national government.  Effective 
constitutional politics required coordination between party members in different branches of the 
national government rather than sharp functional separation.  Little need existed for serious 
thinking about how to allocate constitutional authority between governing institutions in a 
system in which the President, judicial majority, and majority in both Houses of Congress shared 
a common constitutional vision.  Van Buren and other partisans tended to be very pragmatic 
when disputes arose between different institutions controlled by different parties, more often 
defending the particular institution their party controlled than advocating a general theory of 
constitutional authority.108   One consequence of this emphasis on party as the vehicle for 
resolving constitutional disputes is that Republicans in general and Abraham Lincoln in 
particular had no well thought out theory of the separation of powers when Republicans gained 
control of the elected branches of the national government in 1860.109  The theory of 
constitutional authority Lincoln advanced in his debates with Douglas and during the First 
Inaugural was designed to explain why Republicans in power could challenge constitutional 
decisions previously made by the Supreme Court.  As of March 5, 1861, Lincoln had said 
nothing about the allocation of constitutional authority when Republicans in different branches 
of the national government disputed the meaning of some constitutional provision. 
 Committed to the legitimate party of the people as the institution responsible for 
resolving constitutional disputes, Republicans immediately after the Civil War were more 
concerned with which party controlled the meaning of existing enumerated powers, rights, and 
restrictions than with resolving controversies of the meaning of the Constitution of 1865.  
Republicans in both 1860 and in 1865 recognized that intra-party disputes existed over the 
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constitutional status of persons of color.  The main goal of the Republican Party in the late 1850s 
was to find a way within the structure of existing constitutional politics to ensure that popular 
majorities, rather than an oligarchic Slave Power, resolved those disputes.  The main goal of the 
Republican Party in 1865 was to construct a constitutional politics that made sure that disputes 
over the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment were decided by the persons who remained loyal 
during the Civil War rather than traitors and copperheads. 
 
B. Two Threats 
 
The Republican Party when the Thirty-Ninth Congress met confronted two potential 
threats to their constitutional commitment to a broad interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  The first possible threat was that Republicans lacked the constitutional authority to 
combat a southern resurgence.  In this view, championed by John Bingham, the Constitution 
needed amendment in order to provide Congress with the legal power necessary to prevent 
persons of color in the South from being practically enslaved and to protect southern Unionists 
from gross rights violations.  The second possible threat was that Republicans lacked the 
political strength necessary to combat a southern resurgence.  In this view, championed by 
Thaddeus Stevens, the Constitution needed amendment to prevent a revived Slave Power from 
regaining control of the elected branches of the national government and then repealing the 
constitutional legislation Republicans had passed that prevented persons of color in the south 
from being practically enslaved and protected the rights of southern Unionists.  
 
1. John Bingham’s Perceived Threat 
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Bingham maintained that Republicans majorities in Congress lacked the legal authority to 
prevent the South from practically reenslaving persons of color.  When opposing the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, Bingham declared, “The Constitution does not delegate to the United States the 
power to punish offenses against the life, liberty or property of the citizen in the States, nor does 
it prohibit that power to the States, to be by them exercised.”  In his view, “The prohibitions of 
power by the Constitution to the States are express prohibitions, as that no State shall enter into 
any treaty, &c., or emit bills of credit, or pass any bill of attainder, &c.” 110  Unlike many 
Democrats, who opposed on the merits laws granting rights to freed slaves, Bingham emphasized 
that he personally favored providing substantial legal protections to persons of color.  His 
objection to the Civil Rights Act went solely to the constitutionality of the bill, not to the policies 
being enacted.  He informed follow members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress,   
The law in every State should be just; it should be no respecter of persons.  It is 
otherwise now, and it has been otherwise for many years in many of the States of 
the Union.  I should remedy that not by an arbitrary assumption of power, but by 
amending the Constitution of the United States, expressly prohibiting the States 
from any such abuse of power in the future.111 
 
Until a constitutional amendment added the relevant enumerated powers, rights and restrictions, 
Bingham maintained, Congress had no legal authority to interfere when former Confederate 
states enacted Black Codes and otherwise sought to restore the antebellum status quo within their 
jurisdictions.  Bingham during the debates over the stand-alone version of Section 2 announced 
he would “tremble for the future of my country,” unless Congress passed “another general 
amendment to the Constitution which looks to the grant of express power to the Congress of the 
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United States to enforce in behalf of every citizen of every State and every Territory in the Union 
the rights which were guarantied to him from the beginning.”112   
 Bingham stood almost alone in both the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and in 
Congress when he repeatedly insisted that Republicans lacked the constitutional authority to 
implement their constitutional commitment to “the absolute equality of all citizens of the United 
States politically and civilly before the law.”113  His fellow Republicans in Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, almost unanimously, believed that the Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional 
prohibitions vested Congress with more than adequate legal powers to combat racial 
discrimination and rights violations in the postwar South.   Congressional majorities in the House 
and Senate while the Fourteenth Amendment was being debated first passed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 and then reenacted the bill over President Johnson’s veto.  That measure declared 
persons of color to be citizens of the United States and guaranteed that those persons would 
enjoy “the same rights as white persons” in the civil and criminal law.114  Conservative 
Republicans when defending the constitutionality of these new legal rights and restrictions on 
state power interpreted broadly the rights and congressional powers to protect those rights 
enumerated by the Thirteenth Amendment.  Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois maintained 
[U]nder the constitutional amendment which we have now adopted, and which 
declares that slavery shall no longer exist, and which authorizes Congress by 
appropriate legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold that we have a 
right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is deemed appropriate, and which 
will accomplish the end in view, secure freedom to all people in the United States.  
The various State laws to which I have referred—and there are many others—
although they do not make a man an absolute slave, yet deprive him of the rights 
of a freeman; and it is perhaps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where 
freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not allow a colored person 
to go from one county to another is certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a 
freeman.  A law that does not allow a colored person to hold property, does not 
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allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is certainly a law in violation of 
the rights of a freeman, and being so may properly be declared void.115 
 
Many Radical Republicans interpreted the Constitution of December 1865 as 
empowering the national government to protect political, as well as civil rights.  Charles Sumner 
and others insisted that some combination of the Thirteenth Amendment, the guarantee clause of 
Article IV, and the congressional power to regulate federal elections authorized Congress to 
prohibit racial discrimination in voting.  Sumner during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 stated,  
Beyond all question, the protection of the colored race in civil rights is essential to 
complete the abolition of Slavery; but the protection of the colored race in 
political rights is not less essential, and the power is as ample in one case as in the 
other. In each you legislate for the maintenance of that Liberty so tardily 
accorded, and the legislation is just as "appropriate" in one case as in the other. 
Protection in civil rights by Act of Congress will be a great event. It will be great 
in itself. It will be greater still, because it establishes the power of Congress, 
without further amendment of the National Constitution, to protect every citizen 
in all his rights, including of course the elective franchise.116 
  
Bingham endorsed this conclusion.  Although he denied that the Thirteenth Amendment 
empowered Congress to pass legislation protecting civil or political rights, Bingham thought two 
provisions in the Constitution of 1789, the guarantee clause and the elections clause, enabled 
Congress to pass legislation enfranchising persons of color.117   
Republicans were internally divided other whether the Constitution before or after the 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment permitted Congress to grant political rights to persons 
of color.  Radicals insisted that Congress had the right and duty to enfranchise persons of color.  
Moderate and conservative Republicans disagreed.  Although most insisted that the Constitution 
vested Congress with the power to protect the civil rights of former slaves and southern 
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Unionists, many denied that the Constitution vested Congress with the power to enfranchise any 
one.  Fessenden, the chair of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, declared, “the States have, 
as the Constitution stands today, the perfect right to fix the qualifications of voters.”118  Bingham 
appears to be the only member of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who thought Congress in December 
1865 had the power to protect political rights, but not civil rights.   
Politics and policy considerations, however, loomed larger than constitutional concerns 
when members of the 39th Congress rejected legislation and constitutional amendments 
enfranchising persons of color.  Crucial Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
believed that neither legislation nor a constitutional amendment prohibiting racial discrimination 
in voting was timely or appropriate.  Some opposed black suffrage on the merits.119  Others 
insisted a constitutional amendment prohibiting racial discrimination in voting could not be 
passed.  Senator Williams spoke for a crucial bloc of Republican Senators when he declared, 
“the evidence before our eyes that the people of these United States are not prepared to surrender 
to Congress the absolute right to determine as to the qualifications of voters in the respective 
States, or to adopt the proposition that all persons, without distinction of race or color, shall 
enjoy political rights and privileges equal to those now possessed by the white people of the 
country.”120   
Had Republicans the will to enfranchise persons of color throughout the United States, 
most would have found the constitutional way.  When members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
debated questions of congressional power, constitutional opinions lined up neatly with policy 
preferences.  With the prominent exception of Senator John Henderson of Missouri,121 those 
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Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who favored legislation granting voting rights 
to persons of color also believed the Constitution permitted Congress to pass legislation granting 
voting rights to persons of color.  Bingham on civil rights and Henderson on political rights 
aside, no Republican in 1866 perceived that a constitutional constraint on congressional power to 
provide what they believed were adequate or, at least, politically feasible legal protections to 
persons of color in the South.  At most, as one legal historian states, “some residual doubt” 
remained as to the scope of federal power under the Thirteenth Amendment.122 
 Republicans were aware that Democrats did not believe Congress had much power under 
the Thirteenth Amendment or other constitutional provisions to protect persons of color in the 
South.  Andrew Johnson spoke for virtually all Democrats when he vetoed both the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill as unconstitutional.  His veto of the Civil 
Rights Act declared, 
It cannot . . . be justly claimed that, with a view to the enforcement of [the 
Thirteenth Amendment], there is at present any necessity for the exercise of all 
the powers which this bill confers. Slavery has been abolished, and at present 
nowhere exists within the jurisdiction of the United States; nor has there been, nor 
is it likely there will be, any attempt to revive it by the people or the States. If, 
however, any such attempt shall be made, it will then become the duty of the 
General Government to exercise any and all incidental powers necessary and 
proper to maintain inviolate this great constitutional law of freedom.123  
 
Still, Republicans in December 1865 were not confronting the problems that would result when a 
Democrats in control of the national government had the power to control the meaning of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions that the party of the people who 
remained loyal during the Civil War intended to secure freedom and equality under law. 
Democratic understandings of the Thirteenth Amendment did not matter as long as Republicans 
were united and Democrats the minority party.  The issue that occupied most Republicans when 
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the Thirty-Ninth Congress met was what could be done to modify those constitutional provisions 
that might nable a revived Democratic/Slave Power coalition to reassert control over the 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment and other provisions that the party of the people who 
remained loyal during the Civil War intended to secure freedom and equality under law.  
 
2. Thaddeus Stevens’s Perceived Threat 
 
 The Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress had good reason to believe that 
postwar constitutional politics might transform the Thirteenth Amendment into a parchment 
barrier in much the same way that antebellum constitutional politics, as manifested most notably 
by the Dred Scott decision and Kansas-Nebraska Act, had perverted what they perceived to be 
the antislavery commitments of the original Constitution.  Republicans regularly heard reports 
from the South detailing how former slaveowners planned to dominate the country by renewing 
their previous alliances with Northern Democrats.  This alliance, if successfully consummated, 
would enable former Confederates to make the Thirteenth Amendment a dead letter and 
otherwise prevent Union states from enjoying the fruits of their battlefield victory.  Republicans 
learned to their horror that they had inadvertently empowered this conspiracy when ratifying the 
constitutional ban on slavery.  The Thirteenth Amendment, by gutting the three-fifths clause of 
the Constitution, threatened to undermine the constitutional politics necessary to make the 
Thirteenth Amendment a living reality. 
 Republicans shortly after ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment were deluged by on-the 
ground bulletins from sympathetic journalists about how the Slave Power intended to win in the 
peace what was lost in the war.  Northern reporters who toured the South, Garrett Epps details, 
observed that “the Slave South, though vanquished, was unbowed, and . . . its people intended to 
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recreate its prewar system as closely as they could, and then return to dominate the Union.”124 
Prominent Southerners when interviewed made such claims as “We’ll unite with the opposition 
up North, and between us we’ll make a majority.  Then we’ll show you who’s going to govern 
this country.”125  Southern elites expected that this revived coalition of former slaveholders and 
Northern Democrats in office would repudiate the debt the United States incurred when fighting 
the Civil War, or at least exempt southerners from paying the taxes needed to service that debt, 
assume slave state government debts incurred during the Civil War, compensate southerners for 
emancipated slaves, restrict speech critical of southern practices, and, most important, develop a 
labor system similar to slavery that would maintain white supremacy.  Carl Schurz, who was sent 
south on a fact-finding mission by President Johnson, noted a southern “desire to preserve 
slavery in its original form as much and as long as possible . . . or to introduce into the new 
system that element of physical compulsion which would make the negro work.”  This revised 
system of labor, Schurz declared, would be “intermediate between slavery as it formerly existed 
in the South, and free labor as it exists in the North, but more nearly related to the former than 
the latter.”   
Northern journalists observed that slaveholders and their potential Northern Democratic 
coalition partners were celebrating one unanticipated consequence of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
a consequence that threatened to structure a constitutional politics that privileged a revived Slave 
Power’s efforts to nullify in practice, if not as a matter of fundamental law, the constitutional ban 
on slavery.  The Thirteenth Amendment repealed the three-fifths clause of Article I.  Antebellum 
northerners had railed against this provision as the primary means by which an undemocratic 
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Slave Power ruled the country.126  The additional votes that slave states gained because slaves 
were counted as three-fifths of person when allocating seats in the House of Representations and 
members of the Electoral College provided the margin of difference in the presidential election 
of 1800, on the congressional vote on the Kansas-Nebraska Act and on other matters on which 
antebellum Americans were divided by section.  Republicans before the Civil War insisted that 
enslaved persons of color ought not be counted at all when allocating seats in the House of 
Representatives and members of the Electoral College.   Former slaveholders after the 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, recognized that disenfranchised persons of 
color now counted as full persons when allocating seats in the House of Representations and 
members of the Electoral College.  Instead of losing representation and political power, as 
antislavery advocates had demanded, the Thirteenth Amendment promised to increase southern 
influence on national policy. This boost to white southern political power, in their view, might be 
sufficient to enable the former slave states to regain control over the national government. The 
Richmond Examiner summarized these southern hopes when asserting, 
Universal assent appears to be given to the proposition that if the States lately 
rebellious be restored to rights of representation according to the federal basis, or 
to the basis of numbers enlarged by the enumeration of all the blacks in the next 
census, the political power of the country will pass into the hands of the South, 
aided it will be, by Northern alliances.”127 
 
The threat Republicans faced in December 1865 was that, on the near certain assumption 
that southern states would not allow persons of color to vote, the Thirteenth Amendment, by 
requiring that southern blacks count as full persons for representational purposes, significantly 
augmented the power of southern whites to control the meaning of any enumerated constitutional 
right and determine the exercise of any enumerated power designed to implement the 
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constitutional commitment to equality under law. Robert Dale Owen informed President 
Johnson,  
By the constitution the representative population is to consist of all free persons 
and three-fifths of all other persons. If, by next winter, slavery shall have 
disappeared, there will be no "other persons” in the South. Her actual population 
will then coincide with her representative population. She will have gained, as to 
Federal representation, 1,600,000 persons. She will be entitled, not as now to 
eighty-four members, but to ninety-four; and her votes for President will be in 
proportion; Congress, if it intends that the Constitutional rule shall prevail, will 
have to alter the apportionment so as to correspond to the new order of things. 
Now, if the negro is admitted to vote, the constitutional rule will operate justly; 
for then each voter in the South will have precisely the same political influence as 
a voter in the North. The unjust three-fifths principle will have disappeared 
forever. On the other hand, if color be deemed cause of exclusion, then all the 
political power which is withheld from the emancipated slave is gained by the 
Southern white if freed slaves were denied the ballot, each Southern white voter 
would exercise three times the political power of a Northern voter.128  
 
Instead of having an 18 vote bonus in the House of Representatives and Electoral College, as 
was the case before the Civil War,Republicans estimated that the Thirteenth Amendment gave 
southern whites a thirty vote bonus in their quest to regain control of the national government.129  
Thaddeus Stevens and other Republican leaders lived in fear that the South would rise 
again.  They repeatedly asserted that the Thirteenth Amendment was likely to become a 
parchment barrier and Appomattox a hollow victory if constitutional politics, as transformed by 
the Thirteenth Amendment, was not immediately reconstructed.   Stevens when introducing the 
first version of the Fourteenth Amendment warned the Republican majority in the House of 
Representatives that 
With the basis unchanged, the eighty-three southern members, with the 
Democrats that will in the best times be elected from the North, will always give 
them a majority in Congress and in the Electoral College.  They will at the very 
first election take possession of the White House and the halls of Congress.  I 
need not depict the ruin that would follow.  Assumption of the rebel debt or 
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repudiation of the Federal debt would follow.  The oppression of the freedmen; 
the reamendment of their State constitutions, and the reestablishment of slavery 
would be the inevitable result.130 
 
Representative John Thomas of Maryland agreed that the constitutional politics necessary to 
enforce Republican constitutional commitments was in jeopardy.  He observed that southerners 
“have the determination to seize hold of the political power, and to use it if possible to punish 
those who have made them submit to the laws.”131 
 Stevens and other Republicans bluntly maintained that constitutional change was 
necessary to preserve the Republican Party.  A constitutional amendment was needed, Stevens 
stated, “to secure perpetual ascendancy to the party of the Union; and so as to render our 
republican Government firm and stable forever.”132  Other Republicans were as direct.  In a 
speech celebrating partisanship, Representative Samuel McKee of Kentucky declared, “I would 
like so to amend the Constitution that no man who had raised his arm against the flag should ever 
be allowed to participate in any of the affairs of the Government.”133  Senator Henry Wilson of 
Massachusetts waxed eloquent on the need for constitutional change that entrenched the party of 
Union.  His speech on March 2, 1866 asserted,  
Mr. President, the House, the Senate, the Cabinet, the President, each and all 
should not now forget to remember that they were clothed with authority by a 
party inspired by patriotism and liberty, a party that proclaims as its living faith 
the sublime creed of the equal rights of man and the brotherhood of all humanity, 
embodied in the New Testament and the Declaration of Independence.  Let 
Representatives, Senators, Cabinet ministers, and the President amid the trials and 
temptations of the present, fully realize that the great Republican party, embracing 
in its ranks more of moral and intellectual worth than was ever embodied in any 
political organization in any age or in any land, was created by no man or set of 
men, that it was brought into being by Almighty God to represent the higher and 
better sentiments of Christian America, to bear the flag of patriotism and liberty, 
of justice and humanity.  Brought into being in 1854 to resist the repeal of the 
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prohibition of slavery in Kansas and Nebraska, the further expansion of slavery 
into the depths of the continent, and the longer domination of the slaver power, it 
has for twelve years, in defeat and in victory, ever been true to country, ever 
faithful to its flag, ever devoted to the rights of struggling humanity.  No political 
party in any country or in any age has fought on a plain so lofty, or achieved so 
much for country, republican institutions, the cause of freedom, of justice, and of 
Christian civilization.  If it should perish now in the pride of strength and of 
power, by the hands of suicide, or by the follies or treacheries of men it has 
generously trusted, it will leave to after times a brilliant record of honor and of 
glory.  The enduring interests of the regenerated nation, the rights of man, and the 
elevation of an emancipated race alike demand that the great Union Republican 
party, the outgrowth and development of advancing civilization in America, shall 
continue to administer the Government it preserved, and frame the laws for the 
nation it saved.134 
 
Republican journalists agreed.  The Springfield Republican asserted that Republican Party had a 
“duty . . . to retain power as long as it can by honorable means, for the good of the country.”135 
 Virtually every Republican speech on various proposed Fourteenth Amendments 
emphasized the need to combat the threat of a revived Slave Power, augmented by the extra 
representation gained by the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the implicit repeal of 
the three-fifths clause.  Many spoke of the specific threat to the Republican Party.136  Others 
emphasized the way in which an augmented representation from the south would threaten the 
both the constitutional commitment to equality under law and the national economy.   
Representative Rufus Spaulding of Ohio worried that the a Democratic Party majority, 
augmented by the Thirteenth Amendment would “repeal many, if not all, of the measures which 
we have adopted for the welfare and salvation of the country.”137   Representative George 
Boutwell of Massachusetts claimed that maintaining the existing ratio of representation “would 
portent the destruction of the public credit, the repudiation of the public debt, and the 
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disorganization of society?”138  Still others focused on the inequities and incongruities of a 
system in which voters in the south gained political power as a result their defeat in the civil war.  
Senator John Sherman of Ohio spoke of the “anomaly of allowing the rebel States an increased 
political power in Congress.”139  “I would not allow this additional number of ten 
Representatives to the late slave States as the reward of treason,” Representative Lawrence of 
Ohio declared.140 
 The consistency with which Republicans expressed immediate concern with the structure 
of constitutional politics contrasts sharply with their attitude toward the state of constitutional 
law.  Republicans who disagreed over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that included only a 
version of Section 2 agreed that unless the basis of representation changed, Republicans might 
lack the political power necessary to implement the constitutional commitment to equality under 
law. 141  John Bingham was the only participant in the brief debate over the stand-alone version 
of what became Section 1 who claimed that Republicans in power lacked the legal authority 
necessary to implement that constitutional commitment.  When the Joint Committee combined 
into an omnibus constitutional amendment proposals to enumerated additional rights and powers 
and proposals to alter the structure of constitutional politics, Republican speeches on the floor of 
Congress continued to focus almost exclusively on threats to Republican political hegemony.142  
As noted above, Republicans in 1866 thought that the Constitution “as it was” placed few legal 
barriers on the capacity of a political coalition committed to equality under law to reconstruct the 
south.  Bingham was performing solos when he gave speeches declaring that Republicans lacked 
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the legal power to reconstruct the south, while ignoring the possibility that in the very near future 
Republicans might not have the political power to reconstruct the south. 
 
 
IV. The Rise and Partial Fall of Thaddeus Steven’s Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 Thaddeus Stevens won the immediate battle over the thrust of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but lost both the war over how the Fourteenth Amendment would weaken the Slave 
Power and the longer struggle over how the Fourteenth Amendment would structure American 
constitutional politics.  As Stevens repeatedly demanded, Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress designed constitutional provisions that they believed would construct an American 
constitutional politics able to parry the threat a revived Slave Power presented to the 
implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Contrary to John Bingham’s concerns, 
Republicans spent very little energy debating new enumerated powers and rights.  Members of 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress rarely broached the subject of judicial review, the primary means by 
which legal constraints are enforced.  Stevens was less successful controlling the precise means 
by which Republicans reconstructed American constitutional politics.  Instead of provisions 
enfranchising persons of color and disfranchising disloyal southerners, the final version of the 
Fourteenth Amendment merely imposed a weakened penalty for states that disfranchised male 
voters for any reason and forbade some former confederates from holding government office.  
The end result was a Fourteenth Amendment Stevens doubted would protect either persons of 
color or the Republican majority. 
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A. Reconstructing Constitutional Politics 
 
Stevens set out the vital importance of reconstructing American politics in his speech 
introducing the Joint Committee’s first proposed Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment that included only a version of what eventually became Section 2.143  As noted 
above, Stevens insisted that a constitutional amendment was necessary to “secure perpetual 
ascendancy to the party of the Union; and so render our Republican Government firm and stable 
forever.”  Such dire consequences as “the repudiation of the Federal debt” and the 
“reestablishment of slavery,” he opined, would “be the inevitable result” of a constitutional 
politics played under the rules mandated in 1789.  The Joint Committee’s proposal to penalize 
severely states that disfranchised persons of color would prevent these outcomes.  Former slave 
states seeking the political power necessary to influence national policy would face a dilemma.  
Stevens asserted, 
If they should grant the right of suffrage to persons of color, I think there would 
always be Union white men enough in the South, aided by the blacks, to divide 
the representation, and thus continue the Republican ascendency.  If they should 
refuse to thus alter their election laws it would reduce the representatives of the 
late slave States to about forty-five and render them powerless for evil. 
 
Stevens endorsed additional constitutional revisions in the pipeline that were more concerned 
with constraining than with reconstructing constitutional politics.  He informed Congress,  
“Other proposed amendments—to make all laws uniform; to prohibit the assumption of the rebel 
debt—are of vital importance, and the only thing that can prevent the combined forces of 
copperheads and secessionists from legislating against the interests of the Union whenever they 
may obtain an accidental majority.”144  Nevertheless, throughout the debate over various 
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versions of the Fourteenth Amendment, Stevens repeatedly asserted the primacy of those 
provisions that promised to construct a favorable constitutional politics rather than centrality of 
provisions that directly made better constitutional law. 
 Stevens made his preference for reconstructing constitutional politics clear when 
introducing and defending the omnibus constitutional amendment that the Joint Committee 
proposed in the spring of 1866.  His speech presenting the revised, five section, Fourteenth 
Amendment to Congress stated, “The second section I consider the most important in the article. 
. . .  The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States to grant universal suffrage or 
so shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the national 
government.”145  Immediately before that version of the Joint Committee’s handiwork was put to 
a vote in the House of Representatives, Stevens gave a speech emphasizing how the clause that 
disenfranchised former Confederates privileged both the constitutional commitment to equality 
under law and the continued hegemony of the party committed to equality under law. 
I should be worried to find that that provision was stricken out, because before 
any portion of this can be put into operation there will be, if not a Herod, a worse 
than Herod elsewhere to obstruct our actions.  That side of the House will be 
filled with yelling secessionists and hissing copperheads.  Give us the third 
section or give us nothing.  Do not balk us with the pretense of an amendment 
which throws the Union into the hands of the enemy before it becomes 
consolidated. 
 Gentleman say I speak of party.  Whenever party is necessary to sustain 
the Union I say rally to your party and save the Union.  I do not hesitate to say at 
once, that section is there to save or destroy the Union by the salvation or 
destruction of the Union party.146 
 
That speech also emphasized the importance of the proposed provision disenfranchising former 
Confederates.  “Without Section 3, it amounts to nothing,” Stevens stated.  “I do not care the 
snap of my finger whether [the Fourteenth Amendment] be passed or not if that be stricken 
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out.”147  Stevens in these discussions also praised what had become section 1.  He referred to that 
provision as “excellent.”148  Nevertheless, Stevens thought that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment merely protected by constitutional amendment what Congress had already protected 
when legitimately exercising its Thirteenth Amendment powers.149  Section 1 was useful both as 
a statement of principle and because the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was “repealable by a 
majority,”150 but Stevens continued to impress upon Congress that, unless constitutional politics 
was reconstructed, a revived Slave Power was likely to horribly mistreat persons of color, no 
matter what the textual constraints on state and national power.  His last speech on the proposed 
Fourteenth Amendment declared, “I see no hope of safety unless in the prescription of proper 
enabling acts, which shall do justice to the freedmen and enjoin enfranchisement as a condition 
precedent.”151 
 The Joint Committee on Reconstruction shared Stevens’s priorities and concerns, even as 
committee majorities often weakened his proposals.  “The question uppermost in every mind,” 
Fessenden’s son and biographer noted, “was the adjustment by constitutional amendment of the 
basis of representation of the South in Congress.”152  The Joint Committee’s report to Congress 
placed particular emphasis on the pressing need to alter the way in which the Constitution 
allocated political power in light of the implicit repeal of the three-fifths clause:  “The increase of 
representation necessarily resulting from the abolition of slavery,” Fessenden reported,  “was 
considered the most important element in the questions arising out of the changed condition of 
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affairs, and the necessity for some fundamental action in this regard seemed imperative.”153  The 
first version of the Fourteenth Amendment the committee approved adjusted representation in 
the House of Representatives and voting in the Electoral College and did not enumerate any new 
powers or rights154  As did Stevens, Joint Committee members favored adding explicit legal 
constraints on government as well as reconstructing constitutional politics.  Nevertheless, 
nothing in the committee’s deliberations or report indicated that Section 1 or Section 5 as a 
means for implementing only Section 1 occupied a particular place of pride.  The final report of 
the Joint Committee presented equality under law as one of many goals the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to secure.   
The conclusion of your committee therefore is that the so-called Confederate 
States are not, at present, entitled to representation in the Congress of the United 
States; that before allowing such representation, adequate security for future 
peace and safety should be required; that this can be found only in such changes 
of the organic law as shall determine the civil rights and privileges of all citizens 
in all parts of the republic, shall place representation on an equitable basis, shall 
fix a stigma upon treason, and protect the loyal people against future claims for 
the expenses incurred in support of rebellion and for manumitted slaves, together 
with an express grant of power in Congress to enforce those provisions.155 
 
In sharp contrast to the fairly lengthy treatment the Report of the Joint Committee gave to the 
threat a revived Slave Power presented to existing legal protections for persons of color, the 
report documented no weaknesses in existing enumerated powers, rights, and restrictions that 
needed constitutional correction.156 
Stevens and the Joint Committee set the tone for the debates on the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Republican members of the House and Senate celebrated versions of Section 2 
and, less often, Section 3 for their capacity to prevent disloyal southerners from influencing 
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American constitutional politics.  “One object I have in supporting this resolution,” Senator 
George Williams of Oregon asserted, “is to deprive the rebel States . . . of as much power in 
Congress as the Constitution and circumstances of the country demand and allow, so that the 
men who saved the Union can provide lasting securities for the future integrity, honor, and peace 
of the nation.”157  Representative Francis Thomas of Maryland insisted that disloyal southerners 
should not be allowed to participate in politics until their participation would have no political 
impact.  He informed other representatives, “I shall never consent that such men shall be 
enfranchised till the foundation of this Government have been so firmly established as that no 
man once tainted with treason can ever exert any influence in unsettling it.”158 
Many Republicans bluntly maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
construct a constitutional politics favorable to the Republican Party.  “If we are a revolutionary 
party,” Representative Robert Schenck of Ohio declared when defending an early version of 
Section 2, “we are only revolutionary in the direction of freedom or equality.”159  Republicans 
when debating legislation or a constitutional amendment enfranchising persons of color openly 
considered which policy best preserved Republican rule  “The time may arrive when the 
southern slaveholders and their northern sympathizers may come so near having the control of 
the Government,” such proponents of enfranchising persons of color as Senator Richard Yates of 
Illinois warned, “that the loyal black vote may be the balance of power and cast the scale in favor 
of Union and liberty.”160  Williams, who opposed black suffrage, stated “Put it before the 
country and commit the Union party to it, the amendment will be defeated and the Union party 
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overwhelmed in its support—and the control of this Government would pass into the hands of 
men who have more or less sympathy with the rebellion.”161 
Proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment often connected more abstract notions of 
political equality with partisan or sectional advantage.  Their Section 2 was the means by which 
the party of the legitimate majority of loyal voters would gain office and govern consistently 
with the majoritarian commitments of the Constitution, and not a gerrymander that would 
provide Republicans with more political power than their support among loyal voters warranted.  
Representative William Kelley of Pennsylvania offered a variation on a very common theme 
when he asked Democrats, “whether there is any reason that when our Government shall be 
reconstructed, one pardoned rebel of South Carolina who may not be able to read and write, and 
who may have fought for four years against the Government, shall in political power, alike on 
the floor of Congress and in electing a President, outweigh three or five intelligent returned 
soldiers of New Jersey, who throughout the same four years fought for the Union.”162  Just as 
Martin Van Buren’s Democrats believed that their legitimate party of the people would gain 
office in a fair majoritarian election,163 so Thaddeus Stevens’s Republicans thought that 
structuring national elections (other than for the Senate) consistently with the principle one 
person/one vote would be sufficient to thwart the ambitions of a revived Slave Power.  
Representative William Lawrence of Ohio was one of many Republicans who emphasized that 
Republicans, as the legitimate party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War, were 
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merely seeking to construct a constitutional politics that would prevent an aristocratic faction 
from exercising undue political power.   
If this injustice can be tolerated and perpetuated, and the late rebel States shall 
soon be admitted to representation, they will enjoy as the reward of their perfidy 
and treason increased political power.  This will reward traitors with a liberal 
premium for treason.  I am unwilling that this gross inequality should continue, so 
that when the representative of South Carolina return to these Halls, each rebel 
voter by them represented will enjoy a political power more than double that of 
every loyal voter of my district. 
 Sir, I would not allow this additional number of ten Representatives to the 
late slave States as the reward of treason.  But I would strike down the political 
power heretofore wielded by the eighteen Representatives of slavery, and make 
the political power of every voter precisely equal all over the land.164 
 
“The question,” Representative Ithamar Sloan of Wisconsin asserted, is “whether we shall amend 
the Constitution so as to make a loyal man at least equal to a disloyal one in political rights and 
power.”165 
Members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress spent far more time discussing what became 
Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment than they did commenting on Sections 1 or 5.166  
The debate over the first version of Fourteenth Amendment, the version that included only an 
early draft of Section 2, took more than a month.  The debate over the stand-alone version of 
Section 1 took two days.  Thaddeus Stevens did not even bother participating.  When both 
proposals were combined, Republicans on average devoted approximately five to ten times as 
many words debating the sections on constitutional politics than the sections on constitutional 
law.167  Most important perhaps, Republicans expressed far more concern with the details of 
Sections 2 and 3 than with the precise language or meaning of Sections 1 and 5. 
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 Antislavery advocates were determined to get the provisions on constitutional politics 
“right.”  If we measure a speech’s influence by citation counts, the speech Representative James 
Blaine of Maine gave on January 8, 1866 was by a wide margin the most important and 
influential address on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.  That speech vigorously objected to 
proposals to allocate seats in the House of Representatives by the number of voters in a state.  
That ratio of representation was unsatisfactory and unfair, Blaine insisted, because the ratio of 
voters to population was much higher in Western states than in New England.168  Blaine’s 
comments touched off a major dispute between Republicans in Congress over precisely how 
post-Civil War constitutional politics should be reconstructed.  “Western” Republicans fought 
for allocating representation by voters.169  New Englanders demanded that population be 
maintained as the basis for representation.170  Radicals insisted that persons of color be 
enfranchised.171 
These matters and many more were carefully scrutinized and decisively resolved when 
Republican minds were focused on the structure of constitutional politics.  The issues relevant to 
the precise language of Section 2 that Republicans debated for almost six months included: 
1. Should the Constitution prohibit race discrimination in voting? 
2. If not, should the basis for allocating seats in the House of Representatives be 
voters or population? 
3. Should representation continue to be tied to taxation, as was the case before the 
Civil War? 
4. Should states lose a proportion of their representation only if voters were denied 
the ballot on the basis of race, or should other laws denying voting rights be 
factored into the constitutional equation? 
5. If a state denied some voters or some voters of color access to the ballot, should 
the Constitution subtract all voters in the disenfranchised class from the basis of 
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apportionment or merely the percentage of voters in the disenfranchised class 
denied the ballot? 
6. Should state decisions to enfranchise women factor into the representation 
calculus? 
7. If a state permitted some people to vote in some elections, but not others, which 
elections mattered for the representation calculus? 
 
The Thirty-Ninth Congress settled every one of these controversies over constitutional politics.  
The final version of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include a provision enfranchising 
persons of color, based representation on population, cut the tie between representation and 
taxation, reduced state representation when any one was denied the ballot, reduced state 
representation in proportion in which eligible men were denied the ballot, and used federal 
elections as the basis for determining who was denied the franchise.   
 The persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment as carefully scrutinized the 
language of Section 3 and as decisively resolved all disputes over how that provision should 
reconstruct American constitutional politics.  The issues Republicans debated at length included: 
1. Should former Confederates be disenfranchised or merely denied the right to hold 
office? 
2. Which former Confederates should be disenfranchised or denied the right to hold 
office? 
3. Should the disability cover all offices, all federal offices, or specific federal offices? 
4. Should the disability be permanent or have an end date? 
5. Could the disability be removed and, if so, how? 
 
All of these controversies were settle by June 1866.  The final version of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not disenfranchise anyone, declared that Confederates who had previously held 
federal or state offices were barred from holding all federal or state offices, and allowed that ban 
to be removed only by a two-thirds vote from both Houses of Congress. 
 Section 1 and Section 5 were not nearly as carefully scrutinized and little attempt was 
made to resolve seeming differences over their coverage.  Section 1 is far less specific than 
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Sections 2 and 3.172 Published speeches in the Congressional Globe suggest no consensus 
existed within the Republican Party over the precise scope of the rights enumerated in Section 1 
or the powers enumerated in Section 5.  Bingham and Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan 
maintained that Section 1 gave Congress the power to enforce the Bill of Rights.  Their speeches 
should be given considerable weight, given that both were on the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction and Howard was the Senator who presented the omnibus Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Senate.173  Some congressmen maintained that Section 1 enshrined in the Constitution the 
central principles of the Declaration of Independence.174  Still others briefly declared that the 
purpose of Section 1 was to remove all doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866.175  These seeming differences may have been resolved in closed-door meetings of the 
Republican caucus, but they were not publicly settled.  As William Nelson notes, “the massive 
quantity of material in the Congressional Globe, in congressmen’s papers, in the state ratification 
debates, and in the newspapers makes it clear that the amendment’s proponents reached no 
agreement even on the issues they did consider.”176 
The brief debate over the stand-alone version of Section 1 highlights several unresolved 
ambiguities in the rights and powers enumerated by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Three 
Republicans in the House discussed that provision during the two days of debate.  Each defined 
the scope what became Section 1 somewhat differently.  On February 27, 1866, Representative 
William Higby of California declared that the purpose of the first version of Section 1 was to 
give Congress the power to enforce the privileges and immunities clause of Article I, Section 4. 
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He did not mention whether the Joint Committee’s proposal would empower Congress or federal 
courts to enforce any provision in the Bill of Rights in the states.177  Representative William 
Kelley of Pennsylvania then took the floor and maintained that the primary purpose of Section 1 
was to enable Congress to enfranchise persons of color, a power he believed Congress already 
possessed under Article I, Section 4.  The next day, Bingham insisted that the proposed 
constitutional amendment gave Congress power to enforce the Bill of Rights.  He said nothing 
about voting rights.178 
 These differences over the scope of Section 1 may be more apparent than real.  Most 
Republicans spoke only briefly about Section 1 on the floor of Congress.  Far more extensive 
debates took place on the Fourteenth Amendment in the meetings held by the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction and in the Republican caucus.  The possibility exists that at these meetings a 
consensus developed on what rights Section 1 protected and the precise scope of congressional 
power to enforce Section 1.  Nevertheless, what evidence we have indicates that Republicans did 
not reach or even try to reach a consensus on the scope of Section 1 when framing the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  No Republican attempted to reconcile different understandings of Section 1, even 
when Democrats pointed out that the text was ambiguous.179  The ink was hardly dry on the 
Fourteenth Amendment when Republicans began to fight bitterly over precisely what rights they 
had sought to protect a few years earlier.180 
 Bingham hardly clarified the meaning of section 1 when, in response to a question asked 
by Representative Andrew Rogers of New Jersey on the meaning of the due process clause, he 
declared, “the courts have settled that long ago, and the gentleman can go read their 
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decisions.”181  Bingham was correct that a substantial body of state constitutional law existed on 
the meaning of due process,182 but that law was hardly settled.  To take an issue dear to many 
reformers’ hearts, some state courts had declared laws prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors 
violated due process rights.183  Others sustained such measures under state due process 
clauses.184  Bingham informed Congress that his proposed Fourteenth Amendment had no 
bearing on state laws granting property rights to married women.185  The Court of Appeals of 
New York in White v. White, however, declared one such law violated the due process clause of 
the state constitution.186 
 Republicans may have legally resolved debates over the rights enumerated in Article I 
and the powers enumerated in Article V, even if they were consciously seeking to resolve only 
disputes over how to construct a constitutional politics that would entrench the Republican Party.  
Just as constitutional provisions may not always mean what they were intended to mean,187 so 
the persons responsible for constitutional debates may settle controversies they did not intend to 
settle.  Most contemporary citizens believe that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
discrimination against Asian-Americans, even if such Republicans as William Higby insisted 
that the scope of equal protection was limited to African-Americans.188 The discussion in this 
section, standing alone, does not refute originalist interpretations that rely on the public meaning 
of the language Republicans used in Section 1, as opposed to their conscious intentions.189   
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Section 1 was nevertheless tangential to the original animating purpose of Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Republican members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress focused their attention on 
the best, political feasible, means for reconstructing a constitutional politics that would privilege 
Republican interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment and prevent the revival of the Slave 
Power.  Their goal was to make sure Republicans controlled the rights and powers enumerated 
by the post-Civil War Constitution.  Nelson notes, “What was politically essential was that the 
North’s victory in the Civil War be rendered permanent and the principles for which the war had 
been fought rendered secure, so that the South, upon readmission to full participation in the 
Union, could not undo them.”190  This emphasis on constitutional politics explains why members 
of the Thirty-Ninth Congress made little attempt to resolve disputes among Republicans over the 
meaning of those clauses in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that enumerated rights 
and powers.  Indeed, as the near complete absence of any discussion about judicial enforcement 
of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests, Republicans in 1866 were also not interested in 
resolving future debates over the meaning of such phrases as “equal protection of the law” 
between Republicans in one branch of the national government and Republicans in another 
branch of the national government. 
 
B. The Missing Judiciary 
 
 Federal courts and judicial review are as absent from the debates over the framing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as the Republican Party is present.  Members of the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress maintained a deafening silence on the constitutional authority of the federal judiciary.  
No prominent framer emulated James Madison, who when introducing the Bill of Rights to the 
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First Congress declared, “independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar 
manner the guardians of those rights.”191  With one exception, no Republican explicitly claimed 
that courts had any direct authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to 
enforcing statutes that Congress passed under the Fourteenth Amendment.  That exception was 
an obscure member of Congress, Representative Giles Hotchkiss of New York, who spoke early 
in the debate and, contrary to some scholarship, appears to have had no influence on the 
evolution of either Section 1 or Section 5.   
 This silence reflects the Republican preoccupation with constitutional politics rather than 
strong commitments to legislative supremacy.  Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress were 
drafting a constitutional amendment that they believed would entrench Republicans in all three 
branches of the national government.  Most expected that Republicans in Congress would 
continue to play the leading role implementing the post-Civil War Constitution, but, at least 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was being debated, Republicans did not detail how they 
expected disputes between Republicans in Congress and Republicans on the Supreme Court over 
the proper interpretation of any constitutional provision to be resolved.  Just as Lincoln when 
criticizing Dred Scott focused exclusively on the right of the majority party to resolve 
constitutional ambiguities and did not offer a theory about the separation of powers,192 so 
Stevens and his partisan allies concentrated on creating a constitutional politics that would 
enable Republicans to control the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment rather than a 
constitutional politics that allocated constitutional authority in any particular way between the 
governing institutions Republicans controlled.  That was a subject for post-Fourteenth 
Amendment debates.  
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The persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment did not publicly debate the extent 
to which Section 1 empowered federal courts to protect fundamental rights.  From April 30, 
1866, the day members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction introduced the omnibus five 
section draft of the Fourteenth Amendment to Congress,193 to June 13, 1866, the day the House 
passed the final version of that five section draft,194 no Representative or Senator stated on the 
floor of Congress that the federal judiciary could directly enforce any provision of that 
amendment.  References to the judiciary in the Thirty-Ninth Congress were largely limited to 
occasional attacks on the majority opinions in Dred Scott v. Sandford195 and more recent 
opinions discussing the status of the seceding states.196  Republicans who commented on various 
iterations of what eventually became Section 1 discussed how that provision authorized Congress 
to pass legislation sanctioning states and state officials who violating fundamental rights.  They 
emphasized the need for adding to the enumerated powers of Congress rather than holes in the 
scope of existing enumerated rights.  Hotchkiss aside, no one explicitly asserted that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was self-executing, that the Supreme Court could declare a state law 
unconstitutional under any clause of Section 1, even if that law was consistent with all 
congressional measures on the books implementing the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 The first version of what became Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment enumerated 
only additional federal powers.  That stand-alone proposal declared: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States and to all persons in the several States equal 
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.197 
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Bingham, who aggressively championed this language, interpreted the phrase “Congress shall 
have the power” literally.  His speech to the House of Representatives on February 28, 1866 
championing this provision focused entirely on the need to augment congressional power to 
protect fundamental rights. Bingham informed fellow representatives, “The question is, simply 
whether you will give by this amendment to the people of the United States the power, by 
legislative enactment, to punish officials of States for violation of the oaths enjoined upon them 
by the Constitution?  That is the question, and the whole question.”198  In his view, no need 
existed to enumerate additional constitutional rights.  Bingham maintained, “there never was 
even colorable excuse . . . for . . . claiming that any State Legislature or State court, or State 
Executive, has any right to deny protection to any free citizen of the United States  . . . in the 
rights of life, liberty, or property.”  What was needed was only an “addition grant of power . . . to 
secure enforcement of these provisions of the bill of rights in every State.”199   
Bingham spoke of the first version of Section 1 as empowering only Congress even when 
he directed legislative attention to past Supreme Court precedents on judicial power to protect 
individual rights.  Citing Barron v. Baltimore,200 the Marshall Court decision refusing to enforce 
the Fifth Amendment against the states, Bingham reminded Republicans that “the power of the 
Federal Government to enforce in the United States courts the bill of rights under the articles of 
amendment to the Constitution had been denied.”201  Bingham did not, however, propose to 
reverse Barron by a constitutional amendment that directly empowered federal courts to enforce 
the bill of rights.  Rather, after noting that federal courts presently had no power to prohibit states 
from violating certain individual rights, Bingham declared that his proposed Fourteenth 
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Amendment remedied that deficiency by authorizing the national legislature to empower the 
federal judiciary to enforce the bill of rights in the states.  He asserted, “but in the event of the 
adoption of this amendment, if [state officials] conspire together to enact laws refusing equal 
protection to life, liberty, or property, the Congress is thereby vested with the power to hold them 
to answer before the bar of the national courts for the violation of their oaths of office.”202   
Bingham’s speech on February 28 repeatedly declared that a constitutional amendment 
was necessary to give Congress the power to protect fundamental rights.203 At no point did he 
state or imply that judges would interpret what became Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as overruling Barron or otherwise construe those provisions as enumerating judicially 
enforceable rights, except to the extent that Congress exercising the new enumerated powers 
granted by the Fourteenth Amendment passed a federal statute authorizing courts to strike down 
state violations of fundamental rights.204  Bingham’s audience understood that the stand-alone 
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version of Section 1 enumerated only additional congressional power.  Representative Robert 
Hale of New York interrupted Bingham to ask “whether in his opinion this proposed amendment 
to the Constitution does not confer upon Congress a general power of legislation for the purpose 
of securing to all persons in the several States protection of life, liberty, and property, subject 
only to the qualification that that protection shall be equal.”205 
 Immediately after Bingham finishing his speech defended the first version of what 
became Section 1, Hotchkiss made the only speech on the floor of the Thirty-Ninth Congress that 
clearly, though not explicitly, asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment should be self-executing, 
that courts should be vested with the power to protect fundamental rights in the absence of a 
federal statute.  Hotchkiss’s very short speech observed that, as Bingham had stated, the 
proposed Fourteenth Amendment merely “authorize(d] Congress to establish uniform laws 
throughout the United States upon the subject named, the protection of life, liberty, and 
property.”206  The New York Republican criticized that draft for leaving fundamental rights to 
the “caprice of Congress.” Bingham’s Fourteenth Amendment, Hotchkiss feared, did not “restrict 
the power of the majority” or “protect the rights of the minority.”  He wanted a Fourteenth 
Amendment that established rights “that cannot be wrested from any class of citizens, or from 
the citizens of any State by mere legislation.”  For this reason, Hotchkiss advocated deleting the 
reference “to Congress shall have the power” in Bingham’s proposed constitutional amendment.   
Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall 
discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as a 
part of the organic law of the land, subject to be defeated by another constitutional 
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amendment.  We may pass laws here to-day, and the next Congress may wipe 
them out.  Where is your guarantee then?207   
 
Hotchkiss did not straightforwardly declare that his proposed equal protection clause was 
directly enforceable by the judiciary.  Still, when previously criticizing Bingham’s language 
choices, he asserted, “Constitutions should have their provisions so plain that it will be 
unnecessary for courts to give construction to them.”208  Given Hotchkiss’s concern that the 
rights set out in the Fourteenth Amendment not depend on legislation for implementation and his 
reference to judicial interpretation, his speech on February 28 plainly called for a judicially 
enforceable Fourteenth Amendment.  Representative Roscoe Conkling of New York also 
apparently endorsed a judicial enforceable Fourteenth Amendment when, immediately after 
Hotchkiss finished, he stated, he “agreed with” the sentiments Hotchkiss expressed.209 
 Whether, as many contemporary commentators maintain, Hotchkiss’s very short 
speech210 was “influential”211 is doubtful.  The Joint Committee on Reconstruction in late April 
1866 revised what eventually became Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as Hotchkiss 
prescribed, directly stating “No State shall” rather than “Congress shall have power.”212  
Nevertheless, no direct evidence exists that Hotchkiss or his concerns influenced this alteration.  
The change in language was animated by a proposal former Congressmen Robert Dale Own of 
Indiana made to Thaddeus Stevens in mid-March.213  Whether Owens was even aware of 
Hotchkiss’s speech is not known and no member of the Joint Committee publicly or privately 
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declared that Hotchkiss or his concerns influenced the revised version of what became Section 1.   
Bingham did not cite Hotchkiss or discuss independent judicial authority when he explained to 
Congress why the Joint Committee revised the Fourteenth Amendment five years later during the 
debate over the Enforcement Act of 1871.214  More significantly, both Owens and the Joint 
Committee had a very good reason for changing the language of Bingham’s proposed 
amendment that had nothing to do with authorizing direct judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Owens proposed and the Joint Committee drafted an omnibus constitutional 
amendment that incorporated provisions that had originally been debated as separate 
constitutional amendments.  Section 1 of the Joint Committee’s late April draft declared “No 
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of 
persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  Section 5 stated, “Congress 
shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”215  If 
Section 1 of the newly revised proposed Fourteenth Amendment retained the words “Congress 
shall have power” and Section 5 was omitted, a fair inference could be made that Congress had 
no power enforce Sections 2, 3 and 4.  This was clearly not how members of the Joint Committee 
expected the Fourteenth Amendment to work.  Senator Jacob Howard if Michigan, when 
introducing the Joint Committee’s handiwork to the Senate, asserted that Section 5 “gives to 
Congress power to enforce by appropriate legislation all the provisions of this article of 
amendment”216 (emphasis added).  Representative George Miller of Pennsylvania made the same 
use of the plural noun when stating that Section 5 “is required to enforce the foregoing sections” 
(emphasis added).  That speech specifically noted that legislation was necessary to implement 
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more than one section of the Fourteenth Amendment.217  In short, the decision to divide 
Bingham’s original amendment into Section 1 and Section 5 of the new Fourteenth Amendment 
was probably made to ensure that Congress had the power to enforce all provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  No evidence exists that the members of the Joint Committee gave any 
thought as to whether the new omnibus amendment made any provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment self-executing. 
 No member of the Thirty-Ninth Congress who spoke after the Joint Committee revised 
the language of Section 1 asserted that the revised Fourteenth Amendment empowered federal 
courts to protect fundamental rights.  Bingham in his subsequent speeches evinced no awareness 
that the Joint Committee, of which he was a member, made any change in the institutional 
authority for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.  Section 1 of the newly revised Fourteenth 
Amendment, he indicated, was identical to the stand-alone constitutional amendment that he had 
previous stated would empower Congress to pass legislative prohibiting state violations of 
fundamental rights.  Bingham’s speech of May 10, 1866 asserted, 
There was a want hitherto, and their remains a want now, in the Constitution of our 
country, which the proposed amendment will supply.  What is that?  It is the power 
in the people, the whole people of the United States, by express authority of the 
Constitution to do that by congressional enactment which hitherto they have not 
attempted to do: that is, to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of 
all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its 
jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional 
acts of any State.218 
 
Other prominent members of Congress who had special insight into the Joint Committee’s 
handiwork agreed with Bingham’s interpretation of the revised Section 1.  Stevens, when 
introducing the Joint Committee’s proposal to the House, stated that Section 1 “allows Congress 
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to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which, operates upon one man 
hall operate equally upon all.”219  Senator Howard, when introducing the Joint Committee’s 
proposal to the Senate echoed Bingham and Stevens by focusing entirely on how Section 
empowered Congress.  He declared, 
The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the 
power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great 
fundamental guarantees.  How will it be done under the present amendment?  As I 
have remarked, they are not powers granted to Congress, and therefore it is 
necessary, if they are to be effectuated and enforced, as they assuredly ought to 
be, that additional power should be given to Congress to that end.  This is done by 
the fifth section of this amendment, which declares that “the Congress shall have 
power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.”  Here is 
a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the principles 
of all these guarantees, a power not found in the Constitution.220 
 
Howard did diverge from Bingham in one potentially important respect.  Bingham never 
intimated that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment had any legal consequences in the 
absence of a federal statute enforcing that provision.  Howard, by comparison, made comments 
suggesting that Section 1 had immediate legal consequences.  The equal protection clause, he 
claimed, “abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of 
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.”221  Nevertheless, when 
Howard discussed how the Fourteenth Amendment would be implemented, he spoke only of 
federal legislation, and did not hint at direct enforcement by federal courts.  Section 5, he 
concluded,  
casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the 
sections of the amendment are carried out in good faith, and that no State 
infringes the rights of persons and property.  I look upon this claim as 
indispensable for the reason that it thus imposes upon Congress this power and 
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this duty.  It enables Congress, in case the States shall enact laws in conflict with 
the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal 
congressional enactment.222 
 
No member of the Joint Committee even intimated that the language of what was now Section 1 
had been changed to permit direct judicial enforcement of certain fundamental rights. 
Republicans came close, perhaps very close, to asserting that federal courts could treat 
the Fourteenth Amendment as self-executing only when debating how Section 1 would work 
should Democrats return to power.  Several Republicans celebrated the constitutional protections 
enumerated in Section 1 for fundamental rights because they acknowledged that the Civil Rights 
Act and other exercises of congressional power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
were  “repealable by a majority.”223  Representative John Broomall of Pennsylvania claimed that 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would “prevent[] a mere majority from repealing the 
[Civil Rights Act].”224  A fair case can obviously be made that the representatives who made this 
claim assumed that Republicans in the federal judiciary would protect Fourteenth Amendment 
rights directly should Democrats in the elected branches of the government pass legislation 
repealing statutory protections for fundamental rights.  Nevertheless, this judicial power was 
never explicitly asserted.  No Republican took the floor of Congress and declared that the 
proposed Fourteenth Amendment empowered the federal judiciary to protect rights in the 
absence of legislation.  
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 That judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment was so obvious as to go unsaid 
seems unlikely.  Thousands of pages in the Congressional Globe report the debate over various 
proposed Fourteenth Amendments and related measures.  Members of Congress left very little, if 
anything, either unsaid or to the imagination.  Given the sheer number of words devoted to 
Republican proposals to amend the Constitution, that no member of Congress even casually 
stated that persons could vindicate constitutional rights by bringing a lawsuit based solely on 
Section 1 seems astonishing.   
The constitutional authority of the federal judiciary was not so entrenched or settled in 
1866 as to make claims analogous to Madison’s assertion about “independent tribunals of 
justice” unnecessary during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment.225   Republicans in 
1866 shared no common understanding about judicial power that could be taken for granted by 
all members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress.    Some leaned toward judicial supremacy, while 
others believed constitutional authority was vested in the national legislature.226  Many adjusted 
understandings of constitutional authority in light of rapidly changing political circumstances.   
One strand of Republican thought before, during, and after the Civil War was sharply 
critical of judicial authority.  Many Republicans supported resolutions nullifying the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in fugitive slave cases.227  Abraham Lincoln declared he would not be bound 
by the principles underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott and he flagrantly 
ignored a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Roger Taney.228  Defying Dred Scott, the 
Lincoln Administration treated persons of color as citizens of the United States and Republicans 
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in 1862 passed legislation banning slavery in American territories.229  Prominent Republicans 
during the second session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress defended legislative supremacy.  
Thaddeus Stevens maintained, “The legislative power is the sole guardian of [constitutional] 
sovereignty.”230  Many Republicans in the late 1860s supported bills stripping the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction, overruling judicial decisions in constitutional cases, and sharply limiting or 
abolishing the Supreme Court’s power to declare laws unconstitutional.231   
Another powerful strand of Republican thought endorsed judicial authority.  Most 
Republicans were former Whigs, the antebellum party that tended to favor judicial supremacy.232  
Republican majorities consistently rebuffed radical attempts to curtail judicial power.  When 
some Republicans moved to weaken particular federal judiciary capacities, other and sometimes 
the same Republicans moved to strengthen different federal judicial capacities.  The Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, the Removal Act of 1866 and the Removal Act of 1867 all expanded federal 
judiciary authority to hear claims of federal right.233  As Stanley Kutler and others have pointed 
out, many Republicans during Reconstruction looked forward to a reconstructed federal judiciary 
that would promote Republican constitutional visions in some unspecified way.234  
The presence of these strong anti-court and pro-court strands in Republican thought 
counsels again using any master principle when trying to glean Republican attitudes towards 
judicial enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment from the sparse record.  Republicans became 
united on the need for judicial power only in late 1874, after Democrats had regained control of 
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the House of Representatives.235  Until then, inferences from silence and ambiguity about 
prominent Republicans attitudes toward the constitutional authority of federal courts are 
treacherous. 
  The dearth of discussion better supports the conclusion that Republicans did not think 
seriously about federal judicial enforcement when they considered how the post-Civil War 
Amendments would work than the view that Republicans had an implicit commitment to a 
particular allocation of constitutional authority between the branches of the national government.  
The same Republicans who never uttered a sentence of the form, “federal courts may directly 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,” also never made an assertion of the form “federal courts 
may not directly enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.”  The federal judiciary was largely missing 
in action, not an enemy combatants or a loyal ally, during the debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  For various reasons, the possibility of judicial review was simply not relevant to 
the major problems Republicans faced when the Thirty-Ninth Congress in December 1865 
debated proposed constitutional amendments. 
From Republican perspectives, independent judicial authority to interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment seemed unnecessary or unlikely for the foreseeable future.  Many Republicans 
believed that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 put in place powerful protections for persons of color.  
They were prepared to pass additional legislation securing rights in the south should the 
perceived need arise.  As long as those laws remained on the books, federal judges could secure 
fundamental rights solely by implementing federal statutes.  Sections 1 and 5 would do sufficient 
if they alleviated judicial doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act and related 
measures.  Radical Republicans who believed much more was immediately needed to protect 
former slaves had good reason to be focused almost exclusively on the national legislature rather 
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on than federal courts.  Many proposals for implementing the Thirteenth (or Fourteenth) 
Amendment required legislation.  Congress could pass legislation providing all freedmen with 
the proverbial forty acres and a mule,236 but nothing in nineteenth century legal thinking 
permitted a court to enact Thaddeus Steven’s preferred means for achieving freedom and racial 
equality.  Nothing in Republican experience suggested that members of the national judiciary 
were likely to lead a crusade for racial justice.  Federal courts, structured by the Judiciary Act of 
1837, were bastions of pro-slavery constitutionalism before the Civil War.237  A few state courts 
declared Fugitive Slave Acts unconstitutional, but on matters of black citizenship and 
segregation, state legislatures in the free states were far more egalitarian than state courts.238  The 
Judiciary Act of 1862 shifted the balance of judicial power northward by locating seven of the 
nine reconstructed federal judiciary circuits entirely within states that remained loyal to the 
Union.239  Nevertheless, Democrats in 1866 exercised far more influence in the national 
judiciary than in the national legislature.  Five of the nine justices on the Supreme Court in 
December 1865 were Democrats.240  Four, Justices Nelson, Wayne, Grier, and Clifford, were 
either in the majority in Dred Scott or were on record as supporting that decision.241  The recent 
judicial decision in ex parte Milligan242 sharply restricting congressional power to impose 
martial law, hardly gave Republicans cause for optimism that the justices were preparing to be to 
active participants on the side of the angels in the fight for racial justice in the south.  Given this 
recent practice, the best Republicans could hope for in the foreseeable future was that the federal 
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judiciary, particularly in light of clearer constitutional language, would more consistently sustain 
legislation granting civil rights to persons of color.  Congress in 1866 was the far better vehicle 
for expanding the legal rights persons of color might enjoy after ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
The precise constitutional authority of federal courts was tangential to the concerns that 
animated the Fourteenth Amendment.  As noted above,243 the Fourteenth Amendment was 
designed to create a constitutional politics that privileged government by those people who 
remained loyal during the Civil War, the Republican Party being the instrument of those people 
who remained loyal during the Civil War.244  The threat Republicans faced in 1866 was the 
possible return of the Slave Power augmented by 30 extra seats in the House of Representatives 
and 30 extra votes in the Electoral College gained from an amended Constitution that permitted 
former Confederate status to have disenfranchised persons of color counted as full persons when 
representation was allocated.   Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress vigorously debated the 
best means for combating this threat that would be acceptable to most loyal free state citizens.  
Section 2 and Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment were the consequences of that debate.  
Republicans were also aware that loyal citizens did not agree on all matters concerning the fruits 
of the northern victory in the Civil War, most notably on the best means for implementing the 
promise of the Thirteenth Amendment.  They were also no doubt aware that Republicans in one 
institution of government might in the future disagree with Republicans in another institution of 
government.  The Fourteenth Amendment, however, was not directed at resolving present or 
future disputes among Republicans.  The goal of the Thirty-Ninth Congress was to ensure 
Republicans controlled the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.  What Republicans did with 
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that power and the precise distribution of power between Republicans in the elected branches of 
government and Republicans in the federal judiciary was for the future to decide. 
 
C. The Original Design of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to construct a constitutional politics that 
privileged the people who remained loyal, white and black, during the Civil War.  Republicans 
thought Section 2 the most crucial provision for securing their goal of retaining the partisan 
control of the national government necessary for preserving and achieving the constitutional 
commitment to majority rule and equality under law.  Section 2 was designed to place white 
southerners in a dilemma.  Former Confederates could limit the ballot to white persons, in which 
case they would not enjoy the representation necessary to reverse Republican policies on race 
relations and other matters.  Alternatively, they could grant the ballot to persons of color, in 
which case a substantial number of southern representatives in Congress would support 
Republican policies on race relations and other matters.  If Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment worked as Republicans expected, Republicans would control all three branches of 
the national government because a majority of the people who remained loyal during the Civil 
War would vote for Republicans.  Republicans in control of all three branches of the national 
government would determine the scope of federal power to enforce the constitutional prohibition 
on slavery and the constitutional commitment to equality under law.  No reprise of Dred Scott 
would occur because the representatives of the Slave Power who decided Dred Scott would not 
have the power to implement the post-Civil War Constitution. 
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The Republicans who framed the Fourteenth Amendment did not think they were settling 
previous debates between party members over the precise scope of congressional power to 
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment or the differences that emerged in 1866 between party 
members over the proper interpretations of “privileges and immunities” and other clauses in 
Section 1.245  Republicans after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified tended to interpreted 
Sections 1 and 5 as enumerated the same rights and vesting Congress with the same powers as 
they had claimed when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Second Freedmen’s 
Bureau Act in 1866 were enumerated by Sections 1 and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.246  
Thaddeus Stevens, before and after the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, insisted that 
Congress had the power to provide persons of color with a homestead.247  Charles Summer, 
before and after the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, insisted that the Constitution 
empowered Congress to enfranchise persons of color.248  More conservative Republicans, before 
and after the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, disagreed with these claims.249  Nevertheless, 
when making these arguments, Republicans did not assert that intra-party squabbles over the 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment were settled by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Prominent 
members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction repeatedly denied that they were providing 
representatives on either side of internal party debates over what policies promoted equality 
under law with increased rhetorical ammunition for their constitutional vision.  The 
“compromise of principle”250 in 1866 was that the Fourteenth Amendment would be neutral on 
such controversies as whether the Constitution in December 1865 entitled persons of color to 
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vote.  Responding to Charles Sumner’s charge that the first version of Section 2 prohibited 
Congress from enfranchising former slaves, Fessenden asserted, 
It is not necessary that I should discuss the question; for my purpose here, 
whether Congress has this power of legislation or not; whether it has it under the 
clause guarantying a republican form or not.  Opinions differ upon that subject; 
but for the sake of the argument, admit that Congress has the power, how in the 
world does this proposition deprive them of any power they have?251 
 
Stevens concurred.  He informed the House of Representatives that the Joint Committee had no 
intention of resolving intra-party debates over the constitutional status of black suffrage.252 
 Contemporary claims that Republicans constitutionally committed Americans to the 
concept of equality under the law rather than any particular conception253 do not fully capture 
how the Constitution framed in 1866 was designed to work.  Some Republicans did assert that 
the Fourteenth Amendment established or confirmed a constitutional commitment to the 
principles of the Declaration of Independence.  Miller declared Section 1 was “so clearly within 
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence of the 4th July, 1776, that no member of this House 
can seriously object to it.”254  Nevertheless, Stevens and his partisan allies recognized that the 
Devil could also quote scripture.  Slave state constitutions before the Civil War included equal 
protection clauses that provided no balm for slaves or free blacks.  The way in which the Taney 
Court and other jurists manipulated the antebellum Constitution left no doubt in Republican 
minds that a Fourteenth Amendment controlled by former slaveholders could easily be 
interpreted/manipulated to sanction the Black Codes.  If, as noted in the introduction, many 
Republicans thought laws forbidding woman to become attorneys were consistent with equal 
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protection clause,255 then former Confederates might easily insist that the “fitness of persons of 
color for field labor” supported state laws limiting the legal profession to white males.256  In 
short, to use Ronald Dworkin’s terminology anachronistically, Section 2 was designed to ensure 
that only Republican conceptions of equality under law were candidates for the official law of 
the land. 
 Many Republicans hoped that the Constitution of 1866 would constitute constitutional 
politics.  Several indicated that Section 2 was likely to have positive effects on racial attitudes in 
the South.  Carl Schurz believed that once southerners experienced the benefits of the free labor 
system, they would soon acknowledge that system to be far superior to the antebellum slave 
labor system.  “A general improvement will take place,” he wrote, “as soon as southern men 
learn what free labor is and how to manage it in accordance with its principles.”257 Senator 
Henry Wilson of Massachusetts thought once southerners were forced to allow persons of color 
to vote, whites and blacks would soon find common causes and racial hostility would disappear.  
Politics would no longer be a contest between Republican egalitarians and Democratic white 
supremacists, but between different factions all of whom accepted the basic constitutional 
commitment to equality under law.  Wilson maintained, that the “practical effect” of Section 2 
would be this, and only this: it would raise up a party in every one of these States 
immediately in favor of the enfranchisement of the colored race. . . . The 
advocates of negro enfranchisement would themselves speedily grow up to 
believe the justice, equity, and right of giving the ballot to the black men.258 
 
Republicans expected that the Constitution of 1866 would constrain, as well as construct 
and constitute, constitutional politics, although the occasional confidence they expressed in 
parchment barriers is puzzling given the overall thrust of their constitutional thought.  As noted 
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above,259 several members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would prevent the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from being repealed should Democrats return to 
power.  Republicans who expressed this confidence in constitutional words, however, often 
made arguments that cast out on enumeration, standing alone, as a constitutional strategy for 
protecting fundamental rights.  Stevens minutes before asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would make the Civil Rights Act “unrepealable” warned Congress that Democrats in power 
would reinstitute slavery in disregard of the Thirteenth Amendment.  No Republican on the floor 
of Thirty-Ninth Congress explained why the text of the Fourteenth Amendment or alternative 
constitutional language might prevent Republican measures promoting racial equality from being 
repealed the day after Democrats took office. 
 Van Buren’s writings offer one solution to this apparent incongruity.   The legitimate 
party of the people, Van Buren acknowledged occasionally lost control of the national 
government.  He attributed the election of 1840, a Whig landslide, “mainly to a mistake in the 
public mind, which it has since magnanimously acknowledged.”260  Nevertheless, the legitimate 
party of the people might be able to sufficiently entrench fundamental constitutional principles 
so as to prevent the minority party from doing much damage during brief tenures of office.  “The 
long-continued support of a majority of the people,” Van Buren observed, “has secured a 
preference for its principles of which it may well be proud.”261  Thick governing arrangements 
are neither easy to dismantle nor establish in two years.  Whig fails to establish their cherished 
American system during their very short periods in power.  Their example may have given 
Republicans confidence that the a complex reconstruction program developed by a secession of 
Republican Congresses and presidents that was dedicated to realizing the principles of the 
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Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments could not be undone by Democrats only temporarily in 
public office, particularly when Democrats did not control all branches of the national 
government or crucial veto points within the national legislature. 
 In the long run, however, whether the Fourteenth Amendment worked depended on 
whether Section 2 worked.  If Section 2 privileged the party of the people, white and black, who 
remained loyal during the Civil War, then previous congressional legislation securing the rights 
of freedman and southern Unionists would remain on the books, congressional majorities would 
be sufficiently nimble to pass new legislation in response to more creative southern efforts to 
reinstitute slavery and white supremacy, the Union war debt would be redeemed, but not the 
Confederate war debt, and no one would receive a penny as compensation for an emancipated 
slave.  Sections 1 and 4 might remain vital constitutional provisions, even if Republicans 
occasionally lost their governing majority.  Nevertheless, Republicans considered Section 2 the 
most crucial provision in the Fourteenth Amendment.  That proposal to alter the basis of 
representation was the basis of the first constitutional amendment presented to Congress by the 
Joint Committee and the provision in the omnibus Fourteenth Amendment that received the most 
careful scrutiny and debate.  Section 2 occupied this place of pride in 1866 because, Bingham 
aside, no Republican claimed that the legal constraints on constitutional politics in Sections 1 
and 4 would work unless the way in which Section 2 proposed to construct and eventually 
constitute constitutional politics worked. 
 Many Republicans were nevertheless not convinced that Section 2 would work by the 
time the substantially revised Fourteenth Amendment passed both Houses of Congress.  
Prominent Republicans had sought far stronger measures for empowering persons of color and 
Republicans in the south.  Robert Dale Owen’s proposed omnibus Fourteenth Amendment 
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contained muscular provisions constructing constitutional politics.  That proposal, which excited 
Thaddeus Stevens,262 excluded all persons of color in any state from the state’s basis of 
representation in the House and Electoral College whenever that state prohibited any black 
person from voting.  After July 4, 1876, the Owens proposal forbade all voting laws that 
discriminated against persons of color.  Section 3, as originally proposed by the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction, disfranchised all persons who supported the Confederacy until July 4, 1870.  
Both the Owens proposed Section 2 and the Joint Committee’s proposed Section 3 were 
significantly weakened in part because of fears they would not be stomached by the Northern 
electorate.  The final Fourteenth Amendment enfranchised no person of color, disenfranchised no 
former Confederate, and contained a weaker sanction for states that did disenfranchise some 
persons of color. 
 More radical Republicans feared the new Fourteenth Amendment would not work.  Many 
claimed that proposed sanctions for race discrimination in voting would not lead former slave 
states to enfranchise persons of color.263  Others insisted that the constitutional failure to 
disenfranchise former Confederates would enable a revived Slave Power to control southern 
politics.264  Stevens, who enthusiastically introduced the stand-alone Section 2 amendment to 
Congress, far more wearily spoke of the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment immediately 
before the House ratified. Section 2, he complained, “has not half the vigor of the amendment 
which was lost in the Senate.”  Worse, Stevens thought, the revised Section 3 “endangers the 
Government of the country, both State and national; and may give the next Congress and 
President to the reconstructed  rebels.”265 Nevertheless, Republican radicals towed the line.  
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Stevens concluded his final speech on the Fourteenth Amendment by declaring: “let us no longer 
delay; take what we can get now, and hope for better things in further legislation; in enabling 
acts or other provisions. “266 
 
V.  The Collapse of the Constitution of Thaddeus Stevens 
 
Thaddeus Stevens’s attempt to construct a constitutional politics controlled by the party 
of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War proved no more enduring that James 
Madison’s “Constitution Against Parties.”  Both suffered almost immediately from 
misalignments between expectations about how constitutional politics would work and the way 
constitutional politics actually worked.  Madison’s “Constitution Against Parties” proved almost 
impossible to operate in the absence of political parties.267  Stevens’s Constitution, designed to 
entrench the rule of the party constitutionally committed to racial equality, was soon being 
operated by a Republican Party whose crucial western constituency cared far more about 
economic development than persons of color.  By 1900, national constitutional politics in the 
United States was marked by vigorous competition between two non-ideological parties and a 
federal judiciary staffed by judges inclined to interpret Section 1 as authorizing courts to in the 
absence of federal legislation to declare unconstitutional various state restrictions on the free 
labor of white persons,268 but less concerned with imposing legal constraints on state power to 
maintain a racial hierarchy.269 
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A. The Fourteenth Amendment and the New Republican Majority 
 
 The Republican Party fared better than the Constitution of Thaddeus Stevens during and 
after Reconstruction.  With the exception of the Fifty-Third Congress, Republicans between 
1866 and 1913 either controlled every elected branch of the national government or controlled at 
least one elected branch of the national government.  The judicial majority on the Supreme Court 
until 1941 was appointed by a Republican President.  In this political environment, Republicans 
either enjoyed the power to promote their party’s interests and constitutional vision or, at the 
very least, were sufficiently ensconced in the federal government to prevent contrary Democratic 
measures from becoming the law of the land.  Neither the Fourteenth nor Fifteenth Amendment 
helped construct this constitutional politics that so favored the Republican Party.  Congress never 
passed legislation implementing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 3 was a dead 
letter before the end of Reconstruction.  The Fifteenth Amendment, which many Republicans 
insisted substituted for Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a means for promoting 
African-American suffrage and preserving partisan hegemony, was throughout the late 
nineteenth century interpreted very narrowly and implemented only sporadically.  Republicans in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries retained control of the national government 
because Congress routinely granted statehood to low population Western territories with 
Republican majorities long before granting statehood to higher population Western territories 
with Democratic majorities.  The party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War 
became the party of the sparsely populated West. 
This substitution of western voters for voters of color as a means for maintaining a 
constitutional politics that privileged the Republican Party was doubly ironic.  Republicans in 
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1866 repeatedly criticized constitutional arrangements that privileged the south by vesting voters 
in slave or white supremacist South Carolina with far more power than voters in free or 
egalitarian Massachusetts.  Representative Kelley of Pennsylvania was one of many champions 
of what became Section 2 who asked Democrats whether they could   
tell the men of the boroughs of Norristown and Allentown that one red-handed 
rebel in South Carolina is of right and ought to be the equal of three of the best 
and most patriotic of them on the floor of Congress or in the college for the 
election of President and Vice President?270   
 
The strategy Republicans adopted to maintain power after 1866 was based on constitutional 
arrangements that vested voters in underpopulated Republican Nevada with far more power over 
national affairs than voters in well-settled South Carolina.  As ironically, the constitutional 
politics of western statehood enabled the Republican Party to redeem that coalition’s pre-Civil 
War commitment to a west developed for white settlers while abandoning Thaddeus Stevens’s 
vision of a Republican Party committed to racial equality.    
 Neither Section 2 nor Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment exercised any influence on 
American constitutional development.271  By June 1866 when the Fourteenth Amendment passed 
Congress, Republicans had concluded that Section 2 would bear the onus for maintaining a 
constitutional politics that privileged rule by the persons who remained loyal during the Civil 
War.  The Section 3 originally proposed by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction practically 
guaranteed strong Republican representation from the south by prohibiting former Confederates 
from voting in federal elections until 1870.  Many Republicans called for permanent 
                                                 
270 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2468. FIND OTHER CITATIONS OR INCLUDE A SEE ABOVE 
REFERENCE 
271 For a good summary of the debate over Section 3, see Richard M. Re and Christopher M. Re, “Voting and Vice: 
Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments,” 121 Yale Law Journal 1584, 1616-24 (2012) 
101 
 
disfranchisement.272  The final version of Section 3, which limited the right of some former 
Confederates to hold federal office, promised only to affect the identity of the white supremacists 
former Confederates sent to Congress.  The General Amnesty Act of 1872 reduced Section 3 to a 
dead letter for all practical purposes by opening all federal offices to all Confederates who had 
not served in the national government before the Civil War.273  By 1895, Republicans 
acknowledged, “There are no longer any persons living on whom the provisions of section three 
can operate.”274  Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment did no more work than Section 3.  As 
one of the few histories of that constitutional provision concludes, “There never has been a 
successful implementation of the full provisions of section 2 of the fourteenth amendment.  No 
state has ever suffered a reduction in congressional representation through its disfranchisement 
of adult male citizens.”275 
 Section 2 played no role in constructing a constitutional politics that privileged the 
Republican Party partly because that provision was not immediately needed to promote African-
American voting in the South and partly because that provision was almost immediately 
superseded by the Fifteenth Amendment.  While the Fourteenth Amendment was being ratified, 
Congress passed the Military Reconstruction Act276 and a series of readmission measures that 
required former Confederate states to permit freedman to vote.277  These statutes enfranchising 
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persons of color left the Fourteenth Amendment without partisan bite when the Ninth Census 
was taken in 1870.   Largely because African-Americans in 1870 were eligible to vote in 
southern states, the Fourteenth Amendment entitled former Confederate States to presentation 
based on their entire population.  As Gabriel Chin notes, Section 2 did not “offer() coverage 
broader than other laws in force.”278  The Secretary of Interior, after examining 
disenfranchisement throughout the United States, informed Congress that legislation 
implementing Section 2 would make only trivial changes in how representatives were allocated 
by state.  Rather than strip Rhode Island and Arkansas of one representative each, Congress 
allowed representation to be based entirely on population.279  
Section 2 was further neutered when, shortly thereafter, Americans ratified the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which forbade states from passing voting restrictions that discriminated on the 
basis of race or color.  Some prominent Republicans insisted that Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was now either repealed or obsolete.  Representative George Boutwell of 
Massachusetts stated, 
By virtue of the Fifteenth Amendment the last sentence of section two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is inoperative wholly, for the Supreme Court of the 
United States could not do otherwise than declare a State statute void which 
should disenfranchise any of the citizens described, even if accompanied with the 
assent of the State to a proportionate loss of representative power in Congress.280   
 
Other Republicans, most notably Representative James Garfield of Ohio, disagreed.281  
Nevertheless, for the rest of the nineteenth century, Republican inspired legislative proposals and 
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litigation aimed at empowering persons of color were based almost entirely on the Fifteenth 
Amendment.282 
 Those efforts failed miserably.  A series of Supreme Court decisions in the late 
nineteenth century sharply narrowed congressional power to implement the Fifteenth 
Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment rights courts could protect in the absence of federal 
legislation.  Reese v. United States held that federal statutes and indictments had to specify that 
persons of color were denied the ballot because of their race.283  Williams v. Mississippi held that 
state statutes were constitutional if the statute did not explicitly deny voting rights on the basis of 
race, even when those measures were enacted for the purpose of preventing African-Americans 
from voting.284  A Congress committed to racial equality might have been able to work within 
the narrow confines of judicial interpretation,285 but Republicans after 1876 no longer had the 
power or interest in passing strong laws enforcing Fifteenth Amendment rights.  The Lodge 
Elections Bill of 1890 failed when western Republicans abandoned efforts to provide substantial 
oversight over southern elections.286  When Democrats briefly regained control of all three 
elected branches of government in 1892, they immediately repealed many voting rights laws 
passed during Reconstruction.287  Giles v. Harris subsequently ruled that courts were impotent to 
deal with state practices that disenfranchised the vast majority of black citizens in the absence of 
supportive federal legislation.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that if “the great mass of 
the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting . . ., relief from [that] great political 
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wrong . . . must be given . . . by the legislative and political department of the government of the 
United States.”288  
 Republicans made a tepid effort revive Section 2 as a vehicle for that relief during the 
first decade of the twentieth century.289  The Republican Party Platform in 1904 asserted, “We 
favor such Congressional action as shall determine whether, by special discriminations the 
elective franchise in any State has been unconstitutionally limited, and if such be the case, we 
demand that representation in Congress and in the Electoral College shall be proportionately 
reduced, as directed by the Constitution of the United States.”290  Republican members of 
Congress in 1904 and in 1906 proposed legislation implementing Section 2 that would 
substantially reduce Southern representation in Congress and in the Electoral College unless 
persons of color were enfranchised.  No proposal got out of committee. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment also “failed” because many Republicans found the 
admission of underpopulated western states to be an effective alternative for fashioning a 
constitutional politics that privileged the values and interests of the white persons who remained 
loyal during the Civil War.  Before the Civil War, a general consensus existed that territories 
would be granted statehood only when their population entitled them to one Representative in the 
House of Representatives.  Republicans during and after the Civil War abandoned this practice 
when successfully admitting many Republican leaning territories with populations substantially 
below this “ratio of representation” while delaying the admission of several Democratic leaning 
territories that met antebellum statehood requirements.  Nevada, which consistently supported 
Republicans for the White House and consistently sent two Republicans to the Senate, was 
admitted in 1864, despite having less than a fifth the population of the next least populous state.  
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Democratic leaning Utah, which in 1864 had seven times the population of Nevada, joined the 
Union only in 1896.  The lame duck Republican majority in Congress on March 3, 1875 passed a 
Colorado statehood bill that, by expediting the territorial referendum on statehood, ensured that 
Colorado would be in the Union in time for state residents to vote in the 1876 national 
election.291  That state’s 3 electoral votes provided Republican Rutherford Hayes with his margin 
of victory.   
 The way in which Republicans manipulated western statehood had substantial electoral 
and political consequences.  Had states been admitted according to pre-Civil War norms, 
Democrats would have either controlled the national government from 1877-1889 or had the 
power to prevent Republicans from repealing laws passed in the years within this time frame 
when Democrats did have control of the national government.  In fact, aided by Republican 
Senators and Electoral College votes from underpopulated western states, Republicans controlled 
the Senate for all but 2 years during this time period and the presidency for all but four years.  
Only in 1893 and only for two years, did Democrats during this time have the control over 
national institutions necessary to repeal Republican measures and enact Democratic substitutes.  
Such Republican policies first enacted during the Civil War and Reconstruction as high tariffs, 
Civil War pensions, aid to railroads and federal internal improvements survived the nineteenth 
century because the votes cast by Republican Senators from underpopulated states prevented 
Democrats from realizing their constitutional visions and preferred policies. 
 This turn to the west belied the majoritaritarian pretentions underlying the original 
Republican attack on the Slave Power.  As noted above,292 Republicans before and during the 
Civil War complained that the three-fifths clause and the imminent disfranchisement of persons 
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of color would enable one voter in such states as South Carolina to exercise the same influence 
on the partisan composition of the national government as several voters in such states as New 
York.  During the debates over admitting western territories, Democrats complained that one 
voter in such underpopulated states as Nevada would exercise the same influence over national 
policy as several voters in South Carolina. President Andrew Johnson, when vetoing a bill 
authorizing statehood for Colorado, stated, 
The population, it will be observed, is but slightly in excess of one-fifth of the 
number required as the basis of representation for a single congressional district in 
any of the States--the number being 127,000. 
I am unable to perceive any good reason for such great disparity in the 
right of representation, giving, as it would, to the people of Colorado not only this 
vast advantage in the House of Representatives, but an equality in the Senate, 
where the other States are represented by millions. With perhaps a single 
exception, no such inequality as this has ever before been attempted. I know that 
it is claimed that the population of the different States at the time of their 
admission has varied at different periods, but it has not varied much more than the 
population of each decade and the corresponding basis of representation for the 
different periods.293 
 
Republicans were unsurprisingly indifferent to majoritarian concerns or the principle, one 
person/one vote when western statehood was on the table.  Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, 
defending statehood for Nevada, asserted  that “In enabling the Territories to come into the 
Union as States, I believe it will be found that the history of the Government is that very little 
attention has been paid to the number of inhabitants at the time the people have been authorized 
to form a State government.”294 
This effort to construct a constitutional politics that privileged the values and interests of 
the white voters who remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War resurrected Republican 
Party commitments announced immediately before the Civil War.  Antislavery advocates during 
the 1840s and 1850s bitterly complained that slaveholders exercised disproportionate power in 
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the national government in general and over territorial policies in particular.  Van Buren 
Democrats and Northern Whigs/Republicans sharply criticized the Polk Administration for 
settling the Oregon boundary dispute with Great Britain and failing to support internal 
improvement projects in the northwest.295  The Wilmot Proviso, which prohibited slavery in all 
territories acquired from Mexico after hostilities, was advertised as an attempt to populate the 
west with free white settlers.296  These white settlers, antislavery advocates agreed, would return 
control over national policy to free state citizens.297 "We will engage in competition for the 
virgin soil of freedom," William Seward declared after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
“and God give the victory to the side which is stronger in numbers as it is in right.”298   In sharp 
contrast to Thaddeus Stevens and other Radical Republicans in the immediate wake of the Civil 
War, the vast majority of Republicans immediately before the Civil War declaimed any 
immediate interest in race relations in the Southern states.  Abraham Lincoln spoke for almost 
the entire Republican Party when his First Inaugural Address declared he had neither the power 
nor the interest in emancipating slaves in existing states.299  Lincoln thought a policy of 
confining slavery to existing states would eventually lead to the ultimate extinction of slavery in 
the distant future.  The future, however, was distant.  Lincoln admitted that if Republicans 
governed consistently with their 1856 and 1860 platform, a Republican Supreme Court in 1954 
would still recognize the existence and legality of human bondage.300 
 By 1896, the Republican Party had achieved every one of that coalition’s pre-Civil War 
goals (and more).  Antislavery advocates during the 1850s maintained they were in a race with 
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the south to settle and control the west.301  Republicans won.  Republican congressional 
majorities during and after the Civil War determined the boundaries of western states, the 
conditions under which western states would be admitted, and the timing of western state 
admission.  The resulting territorial and statehood policies ensured that at the turn of the 
twentieth century most western states had more in common politically, economically and 
culturally with Republican midwestern states than with Democratic former Confederate states.  
Antislavery advocates before the Civil War maintained that control over the west was an 
essential means for ensuring that voters in the free states determined national policy.  National 
policy after the Civil War on such matters as the tariff and internal improvements promoted 
northern interests in large part because Republicans representatives from underpopulated western 
states cast crucial votes for tariffs and aid for economic development.302  As Lincoln promised 
when running for president, Southern racial policies did not spread through the country.  Racism 
was prevalent in the north and west in 1860 and at the turn of the twentieth century.303  
Nevertheless, no state or territory in which slavery was banned before the Civil War 
disfranchised most male citizens of color or adopted comprehensive racial segregation policies.  
 Each western state admitted to the Union pushed the Republican Party further toward that 
coalition’s original pre-Civil War commitments to white voters and away from the egalitarian 
commitments that animated most party members, Thaddeus Stevens in particular, immediately 
after the Civil War.  While some western Republicans during Reconstruction initially supported 
the radical wing of the Republican Party,304 most in the following decades lost interest in 
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protecting persons of color in the south.305  Republican members of Congress from new states 
preferred championing policies that promoted western economic development.  Such former 
Republican radicals as Senator William Stewart of Nevada proved quite willing to make deals 
with southerners to achieve those ends.  The final nail in Reconstruction’s coffin was laid in 
1890, when western Republicans, after inducing increased southern opposition to the gold 
standard, abandoned Senator Henry Cabot Lodge’s effort to push through Congress a bill 
protecting black voting rights.306 
 
B. The Second Transformation of American Constitutional Politics 
 
 
 The Republican Party that depended on votes from underpopulated western states to 
maintain control over national policy was not the Republican Party that framed the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Republican Party of Thaddeus Stevens and Abraham Lincoln was committed 
to first preventing the extension of slavery and then to securing equality before the law for all 
persons.  Disagreements over such questions as the tariff were submerged so that the party could 
present a united front on slavery and racial equality.307  The Republican Party at the turn of the 
twentieth century was committed to the protective tariff and national policies promoting 
economic development.  The failed Lodge Bill of 1890 demonstrated the willingness of crucial 
Republican factions to submerge disagreements over racial equality when they threatened the 
economic interests of vital Republican constituencies.308  The Republican Party of Thaddeus 
Stevens (and Martin Van Buren) maintained that the free people of the north needed to organize 
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and maintain a permanent political coalition in order to preserve the Constitution’s majoritarian 
and substantive commitments from an aristocratic Money/Slave Power.  The Republican Party at 
the turn of the century had become one of two major political parties that competed for the spoils 
of government. Professor Stephen Skowronek describes this American regime that developed 
during the late nineteenth century as a “state of courts and parties.”309  Courts established the 
legal constraints on government power and made policy by interpreting vague statutory 
commands.  Parties distributed patronage and other economic benefits.310    
 American constitutional politics adjusted as a constitutional order designed to be run by 
the party of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War was replaced by a constitutional 
order run by a two far less ideological parties.  Political parties were the most important 
development in American constitutional politics that took place during the decades before the 
Civil War.  Administrative agencies and the Australian ballot were the most important 
developments in American constitutional politics at the turn of the twentieth century. The former 
was a means to reduce the influence of political parties on public policy.311  The latter was a 
means to reduce the influence of political parties on elections.312 
The federal judiciary was a prominent beneficiary of a constitutional politics structured 
by two non-ideological parties concerned primarily with distributing economic benefits.  
Republicans after suffering defeat in national elections sharply increased federal judicial capacity 
in order to entrench partisan commitments when passing the Judiciary Act of 1875 and the 
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Judiciary Act of 1891.313  Both measures dramatically expanded federal jurisdiction and federal 
judicial power.314  By the turn of the century, both Republican and Democratic legal elites were 
committed to the “cult of the court,” an understanding of American constitutional politics in 
which judges rather than the legitimate party of the people were primarily responsible for 
preserving the constitutional order and resolving constitutional ambiguities.  Party lost influence 
on the course of judicial decision-making.  The course of constitutional law in 1900 seemed 
largely impervious to the elections.315  Justices appointed by Democrats and justices appointed 
by Republicans were as committed to dual federalism and the freedom of contract.316  Democrats 
and Republicans shared the animus to class legislation that structured judicial thought at the turn 
of the twentieth century.317 
The New Deal Constitutional Revolution institutionalized the constitutional 
transformations in constitutional politics that had been taking place during the seventy years after 
the Civil War.  Constitutional developments during the 1930s and 1940s aligned American 
constitutional commitments and institutional responsibilities consistently with the way two party 
politics had been functioning since the turn of the twentieth century.  The result was a liberal 
version of the state of courts and parties.318  Parties in the New Deal regime were responsible for 
making economic policy and determining the precise balance of power between different 
governing institutions.  These responsibilities reflected common understandings that parties were 
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well-suited for these tasks319 and the widespread belief among New Dealers that the framers, as 
good pragmatists, vested the national government with the power to regulate the national 
economy and determine the allocation of power among governing institutions in whatever ways 
elected officials thought best promoted the national welfare.320  Federal courts were responsible 
for protecting civil rights and civil liberties,321 the most important constitutional constraints on 
governmental power.  These responsibilities developed in part because the federal judiciary was 
thought to be the “forum of principle” in American constitutional politics322 and, less 
esoterically, because that institution was staffed by Republican and Democratic elites who were 
far more committed to liberal notions of civil rights and civil liberties than the average member 
of either the Democratic or the Republican party.323  In this transformed constitutional politics, 
constitutional theory was reduced to constitutional interpretation with a dollop of constitutional 
authority.  Constitutional politics was largely irrelevant to constitutional theory because the 
judiciary, the one institution New Deals thought committed to constitutional principle, was 
expected to transcend the party politics of the day.324 
As was the case with both Madison’s “Constitution Against Parties,” and Stevens’s 
“Constitution of the One Legitimate Party,” the New Deal “Two-Party Constitution” began to 
fall apart almost as soon as that constitutional order was institutionalized.  Once again, a 
mismatch developed between the theory of constitutional politics underlying the constitutional 
regime and the way constitutional politics actually worked.  The constitutional politics of the 
New Deal was rooted in relatively non-ideological parties whose elite wings were more 
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committed to liberal notions of civil rights and civil liberties than their mass bases.  By the late 
twentieth century, these parties had been replaced by two ideological parties, whose elites were 
more polarized than ordinary citizens.  The result was a constitutional order many described as 
dysfunctional.325   A full account of this story, Scheherazade reminds us, awaits another day.326 
 
VI. The Triumph of John Bingham’s Constitution 
 
 Professor Gerard Magliocca titled his excellent biography American Founding Son: John 
Bingham and the Invention of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That biography credits Bingham with 
the authorship of “the most important sentence in the Constitution,”327 the provision in the 
Fourteenth Amendment declaring: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 
Magliocca meticulously documents how Bingham tirelessly championed including these words 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.328  The Ohio Republican consistently prodded the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction to propose the privileges and immunities, the due process and the 
equal protection clauses, and he fought for these provisions on the floor of Congress.  Much of 
what scholars know about the original meaning of Section 1 is derived from Bingham’s 
speeches.  Bingham was the only member of the House of Representatives who defended Section 
1 at length,329 one of two members of Congress who defended Section 1 at length,330 and the 
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only member of Congress who gave more than one lengthy speech on the merits of Section 1.331 
“Lincoln.” Magliocca concludes, “was our greatest constitutional poet, but Bingham was the 
man who turned that poetry into prose.”332 
 John Bingham’s Fourteenth Amendment is our Fourteenth Amendment.333  That 
Fourteenth Amendment consists almost entirely of Section 1 and Section 5 as a means for 
implementing Section 1.  With the notable exception of cases involving whether convicted felons 
have a right to vote,334 the constitutional law of the Fourteenth Amendment is the constitutional 
law of Section 1 and Section 5.  Scholarly analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment is devoted 
almost entirely to the proper interpretation of Section 1 and Section 5.  Michael Kent Curtis, for 
example, relied heavily on Bingham’s speeches when he demonstrated that the persons 
responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit state officials from violating the 
Bill of Rights.  Books and articles with “The Fourteenth Amendment” in the title are almost 
exclusively devoted to Section 1 and Section 5.335  Sections 2, 3 and 4 are regarded as 
constitutional afterthoughts.  Magliocca describes as “anticlimatic” Bingham’s last speech 
championing the Fourteenth Amendment, the one speech Bingham gave in the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress that focused on Section 3 and Section 4.336 
 A new biography of Thaddeus Stevens might be titled American Founding Orphan: 
Thaddeus Stevens and the Lost Fourteenth Amendment.  Stevens fought tirelessly for strong 
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versions of what became Section 2 and Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In his view, 
persons of color could achieve racial equality in the United States only if a Republican Party 
committed to racial equality controlled the national government and that Republican 
“ascendancy,” he insisted, would continue only if persons of color voted and traitors were 
disenfranchised.  Stevens failed on all accounts.  The final version of Section 2 neither directly 
nor indirectly fostered racial equality at the ballot box. Section 3 was far weaker than Stevens 
thought necessary to construct a constitutional politics that privileged racial equality.  When 
Stevens died in 1868, his Republican understanding that constitutional commitments were best 
preserved by the political party of those who remained loyal during the Civil War was already in 
the process of being by his former allies now increasingly more concerned with gaining votes 
from white citizens from the north and west than from persons of color in the south.337 
The generation of racial egalitarians who successfully championed the second 
Reconstruction in the 1960s338 were more inspired by the constitutional provision Bingham 
drafted than by the constitutional provisions that Stevens shepherded through Congress.  The 
liberal justices and litigators who successfully challenged Jim Crow relied entirely on Section 1, 
which provided legal constraints on the states,339 and Section 5, which empowered the federal 
government to pass legislation implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality.340   
When liberals in the elected branches of government concluded that Sections 1 and 5 were too 
weak a reed to attack some forms of segregation, the turned to the commerce clause of Article 
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I.341   The rare mid-twentieth century commentaries on Section 2342 “fell stillborn from the 
press.”343 
   The prominent debate held on the pages of the Virginia Law Review over whether 
originalists can defend Brown v. Board of Education344 highlights the hold Bingham’s 
Fourteenth Amendment has on the contemporary American constitutional imagination.  Michael 
McConnell published a lengthy essay asserting that the persons responsible for the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended to prohibit racially segregated schools.345  Michael Klarman at lesser 
length insisted that most persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment accepted the 
constitutionality of segregated schools.346  Although neither essay cited Bingham, Bingham 
might have been pleased by the way the authors framed the constitutional question at issue.  
McConnell and Klarman assumed that the persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment 
thought their efforts were directly primary toward providing new legal constraints on state 
governments and empowering Congress to implement those legal constraints.  Both assumed 
prominent Republicans intended to settle the constitutional status of racial segregation in public 
schools when they drafted and ratified the equal protection clause.  McConnell purported to 
“demonstrate that the belief that school segregation does in fact violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment was held during the years immediately following ratification by a substantial 
majority of political leaders who had supported the Amendment.”347  Klarman asserted, “It is 
inconceivable that most -- indeed even very many -- Americans in 1866 - 68 would have 
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endorsed a constitutional amendment to forbid public school segregation.”348 We may not know 
what Bingham thought about Jim Crow education, but he, McConnell and Klarman agreed that 
what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did about segregated schools depends on the 
proper interpretation of the words used in Section 1. 
 Thaddeus Stevens might think the debate misguided.  His Fourteenth Amendment was 
not designed to resolve differences among Republican Party members or the people who 
remained loyal during the Civil War over such specific applications of the constuitutional 
commitment to equality under law as the constitutional status of segregated schools.  Rather, the 
Fourteenth Amendment Stevens championed was designed to ensure that Republicans, the party 
of the people who remained loyal during the Civil War, controlled the meaning of the Thirteenth 
Amendment for the foreseeable future.  If Republicans decided that freedoms protected by the 
Thirteenth Amendment entailed a racial equality inconsistent with segregated schools, then the 
constitutional politics constructed by the Fourteenth Amendment would empower Republicans in 
Congress to pass legislation prohibiting segregated schools and Republicans in the federal 
judiciary to declare segregated schools unconstitutional.  That, however, was for Republicans to 
decide in the future.  The Fourteenth Amendment Stevens championed did not purport to settle 
any existing disagreement between Republicans in Congress or Republicans in different 
branches of the national government. 
Stevens would also have thought the debate between McConnell and Klarman irrelevant.  
The Fourteenth Amendment Stevens championed that the security of fundamental rights depends 
as much on the structure of constitutional politics as the particular legal constraints on 
government power enumerated in a constitution.  He and most of his partisan allies believed 
Americans could achieve racial equality only if the party of the people who remained loyal 
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during the Civil War continued to control the national government and determine the official 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.   Dred Scott taught Stevens and other Republicans that in 
the absence of a constitutional politics that privileged the election of those persons committed to 
opposing the extension of slavery and promoting racial equality, sophisticated analysis of the 
precise intentions of the framers responsible for particular constitutional provisions is unlikely to 
be of much concern to constitutional decision makers.  Both progressives and conservatives who 
presently fight over the meaning of John Bingham’s Fourteenth Amendment might benefit from 
this lesson in constitutional politics. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
